The impact of corporate governance on cross-border payment fraud: Evidence from Vietnamese commercial banks
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DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.21(2).2026.14
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Article InfoVolume 21 2026, Issue #2, pp. 205-222
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Type of the article: Research Article
Abstract
The rapid expansion of cross-border payments driven by digital banking and e-commerce has increased banks’ exposure to payment fraud, intensifying governance challenges in emerging-market financial systems. This study investigates the impact of corporate governance structures on cross-border payment fraud in Vietnamese commercial banks. The study applies Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation to an unbalanced panel of Vietnamese listed banks over the period 2015–2024, examining a constructed bank-level cross-border payment fraud index in relation to key board-level governance characteristics. The empirical results show that board independence (β = −0.0009, p < 0.01), board meeting frequency (β = −0.0008, p < 0.01), directors’ financial or technological expertise (β = −0.0014, p < 0.01), and female board representation (β = −0.0006, p < 0.05) are significantly associated with lower fraud exposure, indicating that stronger monitoring intensity and governance-related expertise reduce fraud vulnerability. In contrast, CEO duality increases fraud risk (β = 0.0025, p < 0.01), suggesting that concentrated leadership weakens oversight effectiveness. These findings confirm that effective board independence, active monitoring, and governance expertise play a critical role in mitigating cross-border payment fraud in emerging-market banking systems.
- Keywords
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JEL Classification (Paper profile tab)G21, G34, K22, O33
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References43
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Tables8
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Figures2
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- Figure 1. Conceptual framework: Corporate governance and cross-border payment fraud
- Figure 2. Empirical model specification
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- Table 1. Independent variables
- Table 2. Control variables
- Table 3. Consolidated indicators (2020–2024)
- Table 4. Descriptive statistics
- Table 5. Pearson correlation matrix
- Table 6. FGLS results
- Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the research sample
- Table B1. Measurement items
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