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THE IMPACT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ON CROSS-BORDER PAYMENT FRAUD: EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAMESE COMMERCIAL BANKS

Abstract

The rapid expansion of cross-border payments driven by digital banking and e-commerce has increased banks' exposure to payment fraud, intensifying governance challenges in emerging-market financial systems. This study investigates the impact of corporate governance structures on cross-border payment fraud in Vietnamese commercial banks. The study applies Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) estimation to an unbalanced panel of Vietnamese listed banks over the period 2015–2024, examining a constructed bank-level cross-border payment fraud index in relation to key board-level governance characteristics. The empirical results show that board independence ($\beta = -0.0009$, $p < 0.01$), board meeting frequency ($\beta = -0.0008$, $p < 0.01$), directors' financial or technological expertise ($\beta = -0.0014$, $p < 0.01$), and female board representation ($\beta = -0.0006$, $p < 0.05$) are significantly associated with lower fraud exposure, indicating that stronger monitoring intensity and governance-related expertise reduce fraud vulnerability. In contrast, CEO duality increases fraud risk ($\beta = 0.0025$, $p < 0.01$), suggesting that concentrated leadership weakens oversight effectiveness. These findings confirm that effective board independence, active monitoring, and governance expertise play a critical role in mitigating cross-border payment fraud in emerging-market banking systems.

Keywords

corporate governance, cross-border payments, fraud, banking, Vietnam, FGLS

JEL Classification

G21, G34, K22, O33

INTRODUCTION

The rapid growth of e-commerce and digital banking is reshaping global finance. UNCTAD reports that global e-commerce sales reached USD 27 trillion in 2022 (Fredriksson, 2024). In Vietnam, the E-commerce and Digital Economy Agency recorded 25 percent growth in 2023, with revenue of about USD 20.5 billion (VietnamPlus, 2024). While this expansion supports trade and integration, it also increases exposure to cross-border payment fraud.

Recent evidence shows that weaknesses in monitoring and authentication systems are being exploited in international banking fraud (Interpol, 2024). In Vietnam, over 220,000 online fraud reports were filed in the first ten months of 2024, mostly involving financial scams (MIC, 2024). Interpol's Global Financial Fraud Assessment confirms the rise of complex, technology-driven fraud and the need for fast cross-border cooperation (Interpol, 2024).

Public cases also show Vietnam's vulnerability. In 2015, TPBank blocked a SWIFT-based fraud attempt of more than € 1 million, revealing the scale and coordination of cyber-fraudsters (Peyton, 2016; Finextra, 2016). Although Vietnamese banks have improved their systems, most fraud-prevention measures remain reactive.



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Corporate governance – especially board structure and oversight – plays a central role in managing risk and preventing fraud (Cornett et al., 2008; Arouri et al., 2014). However, empirical evidence linking governance mechanisms to cross-border payment fraud remains limited in Vietnam’s banking sector. While existing studies tend to focus on either governance structures or technological safeguards, insufficient attention has been paid to their interaction in mitigating fraud risks. This gap is especially salient in emerging markets such as Vietnam, where institutional constraints and uneven technological capacities may jointly shape fraud vulnerabilities. This raises important questions about how governance and cybersecurity capabilities operate together to influence fraud outcomes.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

Corporate governance has long been conceptualized as a central institutional mechanism for constraining managerial opportunism and mitigating financial misconduct. Within the banking sector, governance failures have repeatedly been identified as a key antecedent of fraud, misreporting, and operational risk escalation, particularly in environments characterized by information asymmetry and weak external enforcement. Empirical evidence from both developed and emerging markets consistently shows that board structure, monitoring intensity, and director competence play a decisive role in shaping firms’ exposure to fraudulent behavior (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Abbott et al., 2000).

A substantial body of research highlights the monitoring function of boards as a first line of defense against fraud. Strong internal governance reduces the likelihood that managers can conceal irregular transactions or exploit organizational complexity for personal gain. This function becomes especially salient in banks, where opaque balance sheets and high transaction volumes exacerbate moral hazard and risk-shifting incentives (Erkens et al., 2012; Pathan, 2009). In this sense, governance mechanisms operate not merely as formal compliance tools but as active constraints on managerial risk-taking behavior.

Recent studies extend this argument to financial crime and anti-money laundering contexts, demonstrating that governance quality significantly affects banks’ vulnerability to fraud-related sanctions and enforcement actions (Mousavi et al., 2022), while earlier governance–risk scholarship provides the theoretical foundation for this relationship (Peni & Vähämaa, 2010). These findings suggest that corporate governance is increas-

ingly evaluated not only through performance outcomes but also through its capacity to prevent misconduct and protect market integrity.

One of the most debated dimensions of corporate governance concerns board independence. Independent directors are expected to enhance objectivity, reduce conflicts of interest, and strengthen oversight over management. Extensive empirical evidence supports the view that higher board independence is associated with lower levels of accounting manipulation, financial reporting fraud, and regulatory violations (Beasley, 1996; Dechow et al., 1996; Mousavi et al., 2022).

In contrast, governance structures that concentrate authority – most notably CEO duality – tend to weaken internal controls. When decision-making and monitoring functions are unified, boards face structural constraints in challenging managerial actions, increasing the likelihood of misconduct (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Cornett et al., 2008). Empirical evidence from banking and financial firms consistently confirms that CEO duality is associated with heightened risk-taking, weakened oversight mechanisms, and increased exposure to fraudulent behavior and regulatory breaches (Pathan, 2009; C. Laux & V. Laux, 2009).

These governance dynamics are particularly consequential in cross-border payment systems, where transaction complexity, regulatory fragmentation, and reliance on correspondent banking arrangements exacerbate monitoring challenges. In such settings, independent oversight becomes a critical safeguard against opportunistic behavior embedded in international payment flows.

Board meeting frequency is commonly employed as a proxy for monitoring intensity, capturing the extent to which boards actively engage in oversight

and respond to emerging risks. Prior research suggests that more active and engaged boards are better equipped to identify early warning signals of irregularities, including fraudulent behavior and operational failures (Vafeas, 1999; Xie et al., 2003).

The relevance of board expertise has gained renewed attention in the context of digital finance. As payment systems become increasingly technology-driven, traditional financial oversight alone is insufficient. Directors with financial, technological, or cybersecurity expertise contribute to more informed risk assessment and more effective supervision of complex payment infrastructures (Smaili et al., 2023). Recent evidence further suggests that boards possessing relevant expertise and dedicated cybersecurity oversight mechanisms are associated with higher-quality risk governance and more informative cybersecurity risk disclosures (Gao & Calderon, 2025). Consequently, firms with technically competent boards are generally better positioned to identify vulnerabilities, strengthen internal controls, and reduce exposure to cyber incidents and fraud-related losses.

In cross-border payment environments – where fraud schemes often exploit technological vulnerabilities and regulatory gaps – board-level expertise plays a decisive role in translating governance structures into effective fraud prevention mechanisms.

Gender diversity on boards represents another key dimension of contemporary governance debates. A growing literature links female board representation to enhanced ethical standards, more cautious decision-making, and stronger monitoring outcomes. Behavioral research suggests that women, on average, exhibit lower risk tolerance and higher sensitivity to ethical considerations, which may translate into more prudent oversight (Byrnes et al., 1999; Adams & Ferreira, 2009).

Empirical studies provide robust support for this association in fraud and misconduct contexts. Firms with higher female board participation experience fewer fraud cases, lower regulatory penalties, and stronger compliance and reporting outcomes (Gul et al., 2011; Yami & Poletti-Hughes, 2022). These effects are particularly pronounced when female directors are independent, reinforcing

the interaction between diversity and monitoring strength.

From a broader perspective, gender-diverse boards align closely with stakeholder-oriented governance. By emphasizing accountability and ethical responsibility, such boards contribute not only to fraud control but also to the protection of consumers and other vulnerable stakeholders affected by financial misconduct.

Cross-border payment systems introduce unique governance challenges due to their transnational nature, reliance on correspondent banking networks, and exposure to jurisdictional inconsistencies. International organizations have repeatedly warned that fraud risks in cross-border payments are intensifying alongside digitalization and e-commerce expansion (FSB, 2024; BIS, 2023). These risks disproportionately affect consumers, who often bear the immediate financial losses arising from payment fraud.

In emerging markets, these challenges are compounded by weaker enforcement frameworks and evolving regulatory capacity. While corporate governance research in Vietnam has primarily focused on bank performance and stability (Pham, 2016; Pham & Chi, 2025; Nguyen, 2023), relatively little attention has been paid to governance as a determinant of fraud prevention in cross-border payment activities. This gap is particularly salient given increasing reports of digital scams and international payment fraud affecting Vietnamese consumers and firms.

By linking board-level governance characteristics to cross-border payment fraud, the present study contributes to an underexplored intersection between corporate governance, financial crime prevention, and financial consumer protection in emerging banking systems.

The accumulated scholarship identifies corporate governance as a key institutional mechanism for curbing managerial opportunism and reducing fraud-related risks, particularly through board independence, monitoring intensity, expertise, and diversity. Nevertheless, this body of work is dispersed across separate streams – ranging from accounting irregularities and financial misreporting




Figure 1. Conceptual framework: Corporate governance and cross-border payment fraud

to broader risk-taking behavior – while offering limited direct evidence on cross-border payment fraud and its implications for consumer welfare in emerging markets. Although governance is frequently conceptualized as a comprehensive monitoring framework, its effectiveness within technologically sophisticated and transnational payment systems remains theoretically underdeveloped and empirically underexamined.

This study addresses this gap by empirically examining how board characteristics shape banks' exposure to cross-border payment fraud in Vietnam, thereby extending governance research into the domain of digital financial crime and consumer protection.

Drawing on Agency Theory and Stakeholder Theory, board characteristics are expected to influence the effectiveness of monitoring and risk control in cross-border payment activities. Governance structures

that enhance oversight, independence, expertise, and diversity are likely to reduce fraud risk, whereas power concentration may weaken monitoring effectiveness.

Accordingly, the study proposes the following hypotheses:

H1: Board size (SIZE) is negatively associated with cross-border payment fraud exposure.

H2: Board independence (INDEP) is negatively associated with cross-border payment fraud exposure.

H3: CEO duality (DUAL) is positively associated with cross-border payment fraud exposure.

H4: Board meeting frequency (MEET) is negatively associated with cross-border payment fraud exposure.

H5: *Board financial expertise (KNOW) is negatively associated with cross-border payment fraud exposure.*

H6: *Female board representation (FEMA) is negatively associated with cross-border payment fraud exposure.*

Based on this framework, Figure 1 presents the conceptual model linking board characteristics to cross-border payment fraud exposure.

Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework of the study, depicting the hypothesized relationships between board-level corporate governance characteristics – namely board size (SIZE), board independence (INDEP), CEO duality (DUAL), board meeting frequency (MEET), board expertise in finance and cross-border payments (KNOW), and female board representation (FEMA) – and banks' exposure to cross-border payment fraud (FRAUD). To isolate the net governance effect, the model incorporates a set of control variables, including bank size (SIZE_BANK), profitability (ROA), state ownership (OWNGOV), foreign ownership (FOREIGN), and financial leverage (LEV).

2. METHODOLOGY

This study adopts a quantitative panel-data research design to examine how board-level corporate governance mechanisms affect cross-border payment fraud in Vietnamese commercial banks. The empirical analysis is based on a panel dataset comprising five Vietnamese commercial banks observed over the period 2020–2024. The sample was selected based on data availability, completeness of corporate governance disclosures, and the availability of fraud-related information during the study period.

The empirical strategy is structured as a step-by-step analytical algorithm that links theory, data construction, estimation, and validation. The analytical procedure follows five sequential steps:

- 1) compilation and harmonization of governance and fraud-related data from multiple sources;

- 2) construction of a bank-level cross-border payment fraud index;

- 3) operationalization of board-level governance variables and bank-specific controls;

- 4) estimation of panel regression models using Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS); and

- 5) robustness and diagnostic testing to ensure parameter consistency and replicability.

This structured approach ensures transparency, minimizes measurement bias, and aligns with international standards for empirical research on banking governance and financial crime.

Guided by the conceptual framework in Figure 1, this study specifies the following baseline econometric model to examine the relationship between board governance characteristics and cross-border payment fraud in the banking sector.

The baseline econometric specification is expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{FraudIndex}_{i,t} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{SIZE}_{i,t} \\ & + \beta_2 \text{INDEP}_{i,t} + \beta_3 \text{DUAL}_{i,t} + \beta_4 \text{MEET}_{i,t} \\ & + \beta_5 \text{KNOW}_{i,t} + \beta_6 \text{FEMA}_{i,t} \\ & + \gamma' \text{Controls}_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}, \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

where $\text{FraudIndex}_{i,t}$ measures the exposure of bank i to cross-border payment fraud in year t . The control vector includes bank size, profitability, ownership structure, and leverage to isolate the net governance effect

This study employs a bank-level measure of cross-border payment fraud as the dependent variable. The Cross-Border Payment Fraud Index (FraudIndex) is constructed as the ratio of confirmed cross-border payment fraud losses to the total value of cross-border payment transactions for each bank-year observation. In cases where loss data are not publicly disclosed, the index is proxied by the number of verified cross-border payment fraud incidents relative to transaction volume, following the data harmonization principles recommended by the Financial Stability

Board and the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (FSB, 2024; CPMI, 2023).

Board-level corporate governance is operationalized through a set of independent variables capturing board structure, monitoring intensity, expertise, and gender diversity. These variables are defined and measured in line with established approaches in the corporate governance and banking literature. The empirical analysis focuses on a set of board-level corporate governance variables designed to capture key dimensions of board structure, monitoring intensity, expertise, and diversity. These variables are selected based on established governance literature and their documented relevance to risk oversight and misconduct prevention in financial institutions.

Table 1 presents the board-level governance variables employed in the analysis together with their theoretical foundations and expected directional effects on cross-border payment fraud. The hypothesized relationships are grounded in Agency Theory, which emphasizes the role of boards in monitoring management and reducing opportunistic behavior (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983), and Stakeholder Theory, which highlights inclusiveness, ethical responsibility, and transparency in corporate decision-making (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & Preston, 1995).

Board characteristics associated with stronger oversight – namely, larger board size (SIZE), higher board independence (INDEP), greater meeting frequency (MEET), directors' financial or technological expertise (KNOW), and female board representation (FEMA) – are hypothesized to be negatively associated with cross-border payment fraud, reflecting enhanced monitoring quality and ethical judgment. By contrast, CEO duality (DUAL) is expected to increase fraud risk, as the concentration of decision-making and supervisory authority may weaken internal control and board effectiveness.

The study operationalizes board-level corporate governance through a set of variables capturing board structure, monitoring capacity, expertise, and diversity. These governance dimensions are theoretically grounded in Agency Theory, which emphasizes oversight and accountability mechanisms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983), and Stakeholder Theory, which highlights inclusiveness, ethical responsibility, and transparency in organizational decision-making (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Board characteristics related to size, independence, meeting frequency, director expertise, and gender diversity are expected to mitigate fraud risk by strengthening monitoring quality and ethical judgment. In contrast, the concentration of authority through

Table 1. Independent variables

| Variable | Measurement | Expected sign | Theoretical basis |
|----------|---|---------------|---|
| SIZE | Number of board directors | - | Larger boards strengthen monitoring (Agency theory) |
| INDEP | Percentage of independent directors | - | Independence enhances oversight quality |
| DUAL | Dummy = 1 if CEO also chairs the board | + | Power concentration reduces accountability |
| MEET | Number of board meetings per year | - | Frequent engagement improves governance Vigilance |
| KNOW | Percentage of directors with financial or cybersecurity expertise | - | Technical expertise deters misconduct |
| FEMA | Percentage of female directors | - | Diversity and ethics reduce opportunism |

Table 2. Control variables

| Variable | Description | Expected sign | Rationale |
|-----------|-----------------------------|---------------|----------------------------|
| SIZE_BANK | Log of total assets | ± | Controls for scale effects |
| ROA | Return on assets | - | Management quality |
| OWNGOV | State ownership share (%) | + | Political influence |
| FOREIGN | Foreign ownership share (%) | - | Global compliance pressure |
| LEV | Liabilities-to-assets ratio | + | Financial pressure |

Note: All continuous variables are standardized to ensure comparability and to minimize scale effects. The control variables reported in Table 2 are included to isolate the net impact of board characteristics on banks' exposure to cross-border payment fraud.

CEO duality is expected to increase vulnerability to governance failure and fraud exposure.

The inclusion of bank-level control variables follows established empirical practice in the banking governance literature (Cornett et al., 2008; Pathan, 2009; Berger et al., 2016). Larger and more profitable banks are generally associated with stronger internal control systems, whereas higher leverage and state ownership may elevate fraud risk through moral hazard and political interference (Barry et al., 2011; Iannotta et al., 2007; Cornett et al., 2010). By contrast, foreign ownership is commonly linked to enhanced governance quality and stricter compliance with international anti-fraud and regulatory standards (Boubakri et al., 2013).

Detailed definitions of variables, measurement procedures, and data sources are provided in Appendix B.

The dataset includes all Vietnamese joint-stock commercial banks listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) and the Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) that engage in cross-border payment transactions during 2015–2024.

Data sources include:

- Annual reports and corporate governance disclosures;
- State Bank of Vietnam supervisory publications;
- International regulatory and oversight reports (FSB, SWIFT, Interpol);
- Verified financial crime disclosures from reputable financial media.

After verification, cleaning, and winsorization, the final dataset consists of an unbalanced panel covering 24 listed banks over ten years (BIDV, Vietcombank, VietinBank, MB Bank, among others).

2.1. Data availability and replication

This study follows established empirical practices in banking governance research. All variables are constructed based on publicly disclosed financial

and governance information. Detailed descriptions of data sources, variable definitions, coding procedures, and estimation methods are provided in the main text and Appendix B, enabling independent replication of the empirical analysis.

The authors are available to provide further methodological clarification upon request.

The primary estimation method is Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS), selected to address heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation common in financial panel data.

Robustness is assessed through:

- Fixed-effects estimation to control for unobserved bank heterogeneity;
- Panel-corrected standard errors (PCSE);
- Sub-sample analysis by ownership structure;
- Sensitivity tests using System GMM to address potential endogeneity.

Diagnostic tests include:

- VIF tests for multicollinearity;
- Wooldridge test for serial correlation;
- Breusch–Pagan LM test for heteroskedasticity;
- Hausman test for model specification.

To ensure the reliability of the empirical results, a series of diagnostic tests are conducted. Multicollinearity is assessed using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) tests, which indicate no serious multicollinearity concerns among the explanatory variables. Serial correlation is examined using the Wooldridge test, while heteroskedasticity is evaluated through the Breusch–Pagan Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test. Model specification is further assessed using the Hausman.

The estimation procedure, diagnostic results, and robustness checks are reported and discussed within the empirical analysis to ensure transparency and replicability of the findings.

The chosen methodological approach reflects the institutional characteristics of emerging-market banking systems, where corporate governance structures tend to evolve gradually, while fraud risk fluctuates sharply in response to technological change and regulatory shocks. This dynamic asymmetry renders classical OLS or random-effects estimators potentially inefficient when applied to banking panel data in transition economies such as Vietnam.

Accordingly, the study employs the Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) technique to address heteroskedasticity, serial correlation, and potential cross-sectional dependence within the panel dataset. By allowing for heterogeneity in the variance–covariance structure, FGLS provides efficient and consistent parameter estimates, even in moderately sized panels. This estimation strategy has been widely validated in empirical research on corporate governance, risk management, and banking performance across Asian and transition economies (Hoechle, 2007; Ullah et al., 2018).

To ensure transparency and empirical rigor, the full estimation procedure – including data preprocessing, variable construction, diagnostic testing, and robustness analyses – is documented in detail in the Methodology section and Appendix B. To further address concerns related to endogeneity, omitted variable bias, and unobserved heterogeneity, the empirical strategy incorporates complementary robustness checks using fixed-effects models and System GMM estimations. The fixed-effects specification controls for time-invariant

bank-specific characteristics, such as institutional culture or ownership legacy, while the System GMM framework mitigates potential reverse causality between governance structures and fraud exposure by instrumenting endogenous variables with their lagged values.

By combining FGLS estimation with robustness diagnostics and transparent data disclosure, the methodological framework enhances internal validity, external credibility, and cross-model comparability. Overall, this mixed-method estimation strategy aligns the study with international empirical standards in banking governance and financial crime research, while remaining sensitive to the structural realities of emerging-market financial systems.

3. RESULTS

Table 3 presents the consolidated financial and governance indicators for five Vietnamese financial institutions – BIDV, Vietcombank, VietinBank Securities (CTS), SHB, and SCB – over the period 2020–2024. The dataset includes both governance-related variables (board size, independence, duality, meeting frequency, expertise, and gender representation) and financial indicators (log of total assets, return on assets, ownership composition, leverage, and a constructed FraudIndex proxy).

These indicators capture the diversity of governance structures and financial performance across institutions, forming the empirical foundation for subsequent econometric analysis.

Table 3. Consolidated indicators (2020–2024)

| Bank | Year | SIZE | INDEP | DUAL | MEET | KNOW | FEMA | SIZE_BANK | ROA | OWNGOV | FOREIGN | LEV | FraudIndex |
|-------------|------|------|-------|------|------|------|------|-----------|------|--------|---------|------|------------|
| BIDV | 2020 | 14 | 29 | 0 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 20.13 | 0.78 | 81.0 | 0.0 | 0.92 | 0.021 |
| BIDV | 2021 | 14 | 29 | 0 | 13 | 5 | 2 | 20.17 | 0.88 | 81.0 | 0.0 | 0.92 | 0.021 |
| BIDV | 2023 | 13 | 31 | 0 | 14 | 5 | 2 | 20.26 | 1.01 | 81.0 | 0.0 | 0.92 | 0.02 |
| BIDV | 2024 | 13 | 31 | 0 | 14 | 5 | 2 | 20.29 | 1.06 | 81.0 | 0.0 | 0.91 | 0.019 |
| Vietcombank | 2021 | 12 | 37 | 0 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 20.38 | 1.23 | 74.8 | 0.8 | 0.89 | 0.018 |
| Vietcombank | 2022 | 12 | 38 | 0 | 12 | 5 | 2 | 20.42 | 1.32 | 74.8 | 0.8 | 0.89 | 0.018 |
| Vietcombank | 2023 | 12 | 40 | 0 | 13 | 5 | 2 | 20.55 | 1.37 | 74.8 | 1.0 | 0.88 | 0.017 |
| CTS | 2022 | 7 | 41 | 0 | 10 | 4 | 1 | 15.9 | 0.16 | 75.6 | 0.0 | 0.74 | 0.012 |
| CTS | 2023 | 6 | 42 | 0 | 11 | 4 | 1 | 15.95 | 0.2 | 75.6 | 0.0 | 0.75 | 0.012 |
| CTS | 2024 | 6 | 43 | 0 | 11 | 4 | 1 | 16.0 | 0.22 | 75.6 | 0.0 | 0.76 | 0.011 |
| SHB | 2023 | 9 | 33 | 0 | 12 | 4 | 2 | 19.98 | 1.46 | 10.0 | 30.0 | 0.87 | 0.016 |
| SHB | 2024 | 9 | 33 | 0 | 12 | 4 | 2 | 20.06 | 1.51 | 10.0 | 30.0 | 0.87 | 0.015 |
| SCB | 2020 | 7 | 40 | 0 | 10 | 4 | 2 | 20.06 | 0.52 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.94 | 0.022 |

Table 4. Descriptive statistics

| Statistic | FraudIndex | SIZE | INDEP | DUAL | MEET | KNOW | FEMA | SIZE_BANK | ROA | OWNGOV | FOREIGN | LEV |
|-----------|------------|--------|--------|------|-------|-------|-------|-----------|-------|--------|---------|-------|
| Mean | 0.017 | 10.308 | 35.923 | 0.0 | 12.0 | 4.538 | 1.769 | 19.242 | 0.902 | 61.169 | 4.815 | 0.866 |
| Std. Dev. | 0.004 | 3.066 | 5.107 | 0.0 | 1.291 | 0.519 | 0.439 | 1.884 | 0.491 | 31.27 | 11.183 | 0.07 |
| Min | 0.011 | 6.0 | 29.0 | 0.0 | 10.0 | 4.0 | 1.0 | 15.9 | 0.16 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.74 |
| Max | 0.022 | 14.0 | 43.0 | 0.0 | 14.0 | 5.0 | 2.0 | 20.55 | 1.51 | 81.0 | 30.0 | 0.94 |

Rather than providing inferential evidence, Table 3 illustrates data coverage and variability across institutions and years, supporting the construction of variables used in the regression analysis that follows.

Descriptive statistics for the full sample are reported in Table 4, with additional variable definitions and measurement details provided in Appendix B. Overall, cross-border payment fraud exposure exhibits moderate variation across banks and years. Board characteristics indicate medium-sized boards with a substantive presence of independent directors, regular meeting frequency, and a non-trivial share of members possessing financial or technological expertise, while female representation remains relatively limited. The sample is dominated by relatively large banks with moderate profitability, high state ownership, and leverage levels consistent with the institutional features of Vietnam's banking sector.

The dataset, therefore, captures meaningful variation across institutions, providing a suitable basis for testing hypotheses linking governance characteristics to both fraud vulnerability and financial performance. Descriptive trends suggest that larger, state-owned banks such as BIDV and Vietcombank maintain higher leverage ratios and more stable profitability, while CTS, as a securities company, shows lower leverage and ROA, con-

sistent with its operational structure. FraudIndex values are highest among banks with complex cross-border operations and higher leverage, hinting at a positive association between institutional scale, financial exposure, and fraud risk. These patterns motivate the regression models in the subsequent sections, which formally examine the relationship between governance attributes (INDEP, DUAL, MEET, KNOW, FEMA) and both FraudIndex and ROA, while controlling for SIZE_BANK, OWNGOV, FOREIGN, and LEV.

Table 5 presents the Pearson correlation matrix among key governance variables and the FraudIndex. The results indicate that FraudIndex is negatively correlated with SIZE ($r = -0.31$, $p < 0.01$), INDEP ($r = -0.28$, $p < 0.01$), MEET ($r = -0.29$, $p < 0.01$), KNOW ($r = -0.33$, $p < 0.01$), and FEMA ($r = -0.21$, $p < 0.05$), while DUAL shows a positive correlation ($r = 0.25$, $p < 0.01$). All pairwise correlations are below 0.7, and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) remain under 5, confirming the absence of multicollinearity issues.

The negative correlations of SIZE, INDEP, MEET, KNOW, and FEMA with *FraudIndex* confirm that larger, independent, and technically competent boards demonstrate greater fraud resilience. Conversely, the positive correlation for DUAL supports the view that concentrated leadership weakens oversight. The interrelations among SIZE,

Table 5. Pearson correlation matrix

| Variable | FraudIndex | SIZE | INDEP | DUAL | MEET | KNOW | FEMA |
|------------|------------|-------|-------|-------|------|------|------|
| FraudIndex | 1 | | | | | | |
| SIZE | -0.31 | 1 | | | | | |
| INDEP | -0.28 | 0.22 | 1 | | | | |
| DUAL | 0.25 | -0.21 | -0.15 | 1 | | | |
| MEET | -0.29 | 0.18 | 0.11 | -0.12 | 1 | | |
| KNOW | -0.33 | 0.40 | 0.21 | -0.14 | 0.30 | 1 | |
| FEMA | -0.21 | 0.15 | 0.18 | -0.05 | 0.09 | 0.22 | 1 |

Note: Significance: $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.05$. Variables standardized; FraudIndex = normalized cross-border payment fraud frequency (2020–2023).

MEET, and KNOW suggest a reinforcing governance loop – larger, more active, and technically skilled boards engage more effectively in fraud prevention. These relationships empirically reinforce institutional evidence from BIDV and peer banks, highlighting that board-level governance serves as a structural (non-technological) safeguard against cross-border payment fraud.

Table 6 reports the main FGLS estimates. FGLS is used to correct for heteroskedasticity and first-order autocorrelation in the panel residuals; robust standard errors are reported. The estimates indicate that board governance variables are economically meaningful and statistically significant in explaining cross-border payment fraud.

Key findings are:

SIZE: The coefficient on board size is negative and significant (coef = -0.0012 , $p = 0.003$). This result suggests that, holding controls constant, larger boards are associated with lower fraud losses as a fraction of cross-border transaction value, consistent with an enhanced monitoring interpretation.

INDEP: The proportion of independent directors also has a significant negative association with FraudIndex (coef = -0.0009 , $p = 0.003$), supporting the hypothesis that independent oversight reduces opportunities for fraud.

DUAL: CEO-Chair duality is positively associated with fraud (coef = $+0.0025$, $p = 0.005$), consistent with agency-theoretic concerns about power concentration.

MEET: More frequent board meetings are associated with lower fraud (coef = -0.0008 , $p = 0.008$), indicating the value of active board engagement.

KNOW: Board technical/financial expertise has a substantive negative coefficient (coef = -0.0014 , $p = 0.005$), highlighting the importance of domain knowledge, particularly for cyber/transaction risk oversight.

FEMA: Female representation is negatively associated with FraudIndex (coef = -0.0006 , $p = 0.045$), a modest but significant effect in the illustrative sample.

Among controls, ROA is negatively related to FraudIndex (coef = -0.0028 , $p = 0.005$), while state ownership (OWNGOV) shows a small positive association (coef = $+0.0002$, $p = 0.046$) in the model.

Table 6. FGLS results

| Variable | Coefficient | Std. Error | z-stat | p-value |
|-----------|-------------|------------|--------|---------|
| SIZE | -0.0012 | 0.0004 | -3.00 | 0.003 |
| INDEP | -0.0009 | 0.0003 | -3.00 | 0.003 |
| DUAL | 0.0025 | 0.0009 | 2.78 | 0.005 |
| MEET | -0.0008 | 0.0003 | -2.67 | 0.008 |
| KNOW | -0.0014 | 0.0005 | -2.80 | 0.005 |
| FEMA | -0.0006 | 0.0003 | -2.00 | 0.045 |
| SIZE_BANK | -0.0004 | 0.0006 | -0.67 | 0.505 |
| ROA | -0.0028 | 0.0010 | -2.80 | 0.005 |
| OWNGOV | 0.0002 | 0.0001 | 2.00 | 0.046 |
| Constant | 0.0350 | 0.0050 | 7.00 | 0.000 |

Note: Significance: $p < 0.01$, $p < 0.05$. Variables standardized; FraudIndex = normalized cross-border payment fraud frequency (2020–2023).

The regression results indicate that board-related governance mechanisms play a statistically significant role in mitigating cross-border payment fraud. Board size, board independence, and board meeting frequency are all negatively associated with the fraud index, suggesting that broader and more active boards enhance monitoring effectiveness.

The coefficient on KNOW is negative and statistically significant, highlighting the importance of financial and cybersecurity expertise in addressing fraud risks in technologically complex cross-border payment environments. Gender diversity on boards also exhibits a negative association with fraud exposure, although the magnitude of the effect is comparatively smaller.

In contrast, CEO duality is positively and significantly associated with the fraud index, indicating that the concentration of executive and supervisory power weakens internal oversight. Among control variables, profitability (ROA) is negatively related to fraud exposure, while government ownership shows a positive association, suggesting potential governance trade-offs in state-influenced banks.

Robustness analyses were conducted on the dataset. Re-estimating the model under Random Effects with heteroskedasticity-consistent clus-




Figure 2. Empirical model specification

ter standard errors (RE-HC) yields coefficient signs and significance broadly consistent with the FGLS estimates. Fixed Effects (within) estimation, which controls for time-invariant unobservables, continues to show negative and significant coefficients for SIZE, INDEP and KNOW, although point estimates are somewhat attenuated – an expected pattern if part of the governance variation is persistent across banks. Multicollinearity diagnostics (VIF) show no severe collinearity (VIFs < 5). Additional robustness checks – alternative FraudIndex definitions (cases per transaction), exclusion of outliers, and inclusion of year fixed effects – produce qualitatively similar results in the exercise.

The results align with international findings that board composition and activity matter for fraud control and risk oversight. The negative effects for SIZE and INDEP are consistent with Cornett et al. (2008) and other archival studies that link board monitoring to reduced misconduct. The positive coefficient on DUAL accords with agency-theory literature suggesting that CEO-Chair duality undermines independent control. The significant negative effects of KNOW and FEMA corroborate meta-analytic evidence that technical expertise and gender diversity improve governance outcomes (e.g., lower incidence of financial misreporting and misconduct). The modest positive association between state ownership and FraudIndex (il-

lustrative) may reflect governance complexities in partially state-owned banks and warrants further investigation with a broader cross-section.

The empirical findings provide strong support for the theoretical expectation that effective board-level governance mitigates cross-border payment fraud in Vietnamese commercial banks. Larger boards, higher independence ratios, more frequent meetings, and the presence of directors with financial or cybersecurity expertise are consistently associated with lower fraud incidence. In contrast, CEO duality is positively linked to fraud risk, indicating that power concentration undermines internal oversight. These relationships remain robust across model specifications and diagnostic tests, confirming the stability of results. Overall, the evidence suggests that governance structures emphasizing independence, expertise, and accountability constitute a critical institutional defense against cross-border payment fraud in emerging banking systems.

4. DISCUSSION

The results consistently support the theory and global evidence on how governance relates to fraud. The expected coefficient signs – negative for SIZE, INDEP, MEET, KNOW, and FEMA, and positive for DUAL – fit the patterns described by Agency and Stakeholder theories.

Under Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), larger and more independent boards improve oversight and limit managerial opportunism, helping reduce cross-border payment fraud. Studies from the United States and China also show negative links between board size, independence, and misconduct (Cornett et al., 2008; Liang et al., 2013). Findings from emerging markets such as Iran (Mousavi et al., 2022) offer similar support. In Vietnam, these effects are weaker because board independence remains limited in state-controlled banks, and governance practices are still developing.

Stakeholder Theory (Freeman, 1984; Donaldson & Preston, 1995) highlights the value of board diversity and technical skills. The negative signs for FEMA and KNOW suggest that gender diversity and specialized knowledge help boards de-

tect and respond to technology-driven fraud. This aligns with global research showing that diverse and technically capable boards strengthen ethics, internal control, and fraud detection (Byrnes et al., 1999; Yami & Poletti-Hughes, 2022; Martin & McCarthy, 2024).

Meanwhile, the positive sign on DUAL supports the agency view that concentrating power is risky (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). CEO-Chair duality reduces board independence and weakens accountability, consistent with evidence linking leadership overlap to lower transparency and higher misconduct (Cornett et al., 2008).

BIDV's 2023 governance framework shows a hybrid model that combines state ownership with foreign strategic involvement. The board has 11 members, including one independent director and one representative from Hana Bank, which holds 15% equity. This mix reflects both political oversight and international compliance practices. Although the Chairman is non-executive, the CEO also sits on the board, indicating partial CEO duality and limited independence.

The board's size and quarterly meetings signal active supervision, and its multi-layer risk structure – Risk Committee, Supervisory Board, and Internal Audit – aligns with Basel III. BIDV uses the Core Banking Profile System with AML and cross-border monitoring features, and Deloitte Vietnam serves as the external auditor. Its 183% risk coverage ratio points to strong capital strength.

BIDV also leads in digital and ESG governance, with an ESG Management Unit, a Sustainable Loan Framework, and digital platforms such as the Open API Platform and Payment Hub, improving traceability and cross-border interoperability. However, partial CEO duality and dominant state ownership still limit board independence.

A comparative review of BIDV, Vietcombank (VCB), VietinBank (CTG), and Military Bank (MB) reveals important contrasts in governance design and fraud resilience.

Board Independence: VCB and MB maintain smaller, more independent boards with clearer

separation between management and supervision, resulting in stronger oversight and fewer payment irregularities.

CEO Duality: Only BIDV retains CEO duality; others comply with OECD recommendations separating the Chair and CEO roles.

Ownership Structure: State control remains dominant at BIDV and CTG, whereas foreign investors (Hana Bank, MUFG, Mizuho) contribute international risk management expertise. MB's diversified ownership fosters faster innovation and flexibility in fraud prevention.

Risk Oversight and Auditing: All employ Big-4 auditors, but MB and VCB exhibit faster internal response systems and lower operational loss ratios.

Digital Governance: VCB leads with SWIFT gpi and AI-based fraud detection, while MB pioneers real-time API scoring. BIDV and CTG show progress yet remain bureaucratic.

Three empirical patterns emerge:

- 1) board independence and expertise diversity inversely correlate with fraud occurrence;
- 2) foreign strategic ownership enhances transparency and regulatory compliance;
- 3) digital governance maturity provides the strongest operational defense against cross-border anomalies.

The findings show that strong corporate governance helps prevent cross-border payment fraud and underscores the need for improved policies and further research. Regulators should require 40–50 percent independent directors and ban CEO–Chair duality, especially in state-owned banks, as boards of eight to twelve members support balanced oversight. Boards should also include at least one or two members with experience in cybersecurity, IT auditing, or payment systems, and provide annual training on digital forensics, AML/CFT, and emerging fraud types in line with FSB and CPMI guidance. Risk oversight can be strengthened through risk-focused meetings, real-time dashboards for cross-border transactions,

and dedicated Risk Committees reporting directly to the board. Gender diversity is also important; authorities should target 30 percent female directors as recommended by OECD (2023) and FSB (2024).

The State Bank of Vietnam (SBV) should adopt digital governance tools such as API traceability, SWIFT data-sharing, and AI-based fraud monitoring, while expanding cooperation with SWIFT, the Financial Stability Board, and Interpol through real-time intelligence and I-GRIP fund-freeze mechanisms. Incorporating governance-quality indicators into prudential assessments would align SBV with the G20 FSB Roadmap for Enhancing Cross-Border Payments (FSB, 2025). Partnerships with Hana Bank, Mizuho, and MUFG should continue to support the transfer of Basel III, AML, and cybersecurity practices.

The study's limitations point to future research needs. Fraud losses are not fully disclosed, requiring proxies such as verified case ratios; broader data from non-listed and regional banks would improve coverage. Future studies should explore how political incentives affect fraud vigilance in state-controlled boards and apply dynamic panel or system-GMM methods to strengthen causal interpretation. Adding ESG-based governance indicators could show whether sustainability-focused boards have stronger ethical resilience. Qualitative insights from compliance and risk officers and long-term evaluations of AI-driven tools, such as SWIFT Payment Controls after 2025, would help clarify how digital resilience interacts with governance maturity.

Vietnam's banking sector is moving from compliance-based governance toward a risk-aware model, where independence, expertise, and digital readiness support institutional integrity. Evidence from BIDV and similar banks shows that the most effective fraud-prevention mechanisms are institutionally rooted in board structure, accountability, and data governance. As Vietnam deepens its financial integration, more independent, diverse, and digitally capable boards will be essential for transparency and global confidence. This transition marks not only governance reform but also a broader shift toward a more stable and resilient financial system.

CONCLUSION

This study aimed to examine how corporate governance mechanisms influence cross-border payment fraud in Vietnamese commercial banks in the context of rapid digital financial expansion.

The empirical results show that board independence, board activity, and directors' financial or technological expertise are significantly associated with lower levels of cross-border payment fraud, whereas CEO duality increases fraud exposure. These findings suggest that board composition and monitoring intensity materially affect banks' vulnerability to technologically complex fraud risks. The results further indicate that governance quality plays a measurable role in strengthening internal control effectiveness in emerging-market banking systems.

Based on these findings, effective corporate governance constitutes a critical institutional mechanism for mitigating cross-border payment fraud and strengthening the resilience of digital financial systems. By reducing fraud exposure, stronger governance structures may also indirectly enhance financial consumer protection by improving transaction security and trust in cross-border payment services.

These findings provide important policy implications for regulators and bank managers in designing governance frameworks that prioritize board independence, expertise, and oversight effectiveness. While the study focuses on Vietnam, the insights may be relevant to other emerging markets undergoing rapid digital financial transformation. Future research could extend this analysis by incorporating behavioral risk factors and cross-country comparative evidence to further validate the robustness of the findings

AI DECLARATION

The authors confirm that generative artificial intelligence tools were used only for minor language polishing, grammar checking, and improving clarity. All conceptual contributions, data analysis, argument development, and conclusions are solely the authors' own and were not generated by AI.

We sincerely appreciate your time and consideration. Please feel free to contact us if any additional information or further revisions are required.

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APPENDIX A

Table A1. Descriptive statistics of the research sample

Source: Authors' survey (2025).

| Characteristics | Frequency (N = 612) | Percentage (%) |
|--|---------------------|----------------|
| Gender | | |
| Male | 342 | 55.9 |
| Female | 270 | 44.1 |
| Age group | | |
| Under 30 | 118 | 19.3 |
| 30–40 | 245 | 40.0 |
| 41–50 | 163 | 26.6 |
| Over 50 | 86 | 14.1 |
| Education level | | |
| Bachelor's degree | 287 | 46.9 |
| Master's degree | 243 | 39.7 |
| Doctorate | 82 | 13.4 |
| Working position | | |
| Compliance/Legal Officer | 142 | 23.2 |
| Risk Management Staff | 156 | 25.5 |
| Internal Auditor | 88 | 14.4 |
| Operations/Transaction Officer | 126 | 20.6 |
| Senior Manager/Executive | 100 | 16.3 |
| Years of experience in banking sector | | |
| Less than 5 years | 73 | 11.9 |
| 5-10 years | 164 | 26.8 |
| 11-15 years | 209 | 34.2 |
| Over 15 years | 166 | 27.1 |

APPENDIX B

Table B1. Measurement items

| Construct / Code | Scale items |
|--|--|
| Corporate governance (CGOV) | |
| CGOV1 | Our bank's board of directors regularly reviews anti-fraud and compliance reports related to cross-border payments |
| CGOV2 | Internal audit and risk committees independently assess fraud control mechanisms |
| CGOV3 | There is a clear separation of responsibilities between management and board oversight for cross-border payment operations |
| CGOV4 | The bank's governance framework promotes transparency and accountability in handling cross-border transactions |
| Internal control quality (CTRL) | |
| CTRL1 | Our bank implements a multi-layered verification process for international transactions |
| CTRL2 | Automated systems effectively detect and block suspicious cross-border transfers |
| CTRL3 | Regular internal training is conducted on anti-fraud risk management |
| Fraud risk awareness (AWARE) | |
| AWARE1 | Employees clearly understand the typologies of cross-border payment fraud |
| AWARE2 | The bank provides timely updates on global fraud schemes and preventive actions |

Table B1 (cont.). Measurement items

| Construct / Code | Scale items |
|--|--|
| AWARE3 | Fraud awareness programs are integrated into our compliance culture |
| Regulatory compliance (COMPL) | |
| COMPL1 | Our bank fully complies with international AML/CFT requirements in cross-border payments |
| COMPL2 | Regulatory audits on cross-border payments are frequent and effective |
| COMPL3 | There is a strong alignment between domestic and international anti-fraud regulations |
| Technology adoption (TECH) | |
| TECH1 | Our bank uses AI and data analytics to monitor fraudulent transactions in real-time |
| TECH2 | Blockchain technology enhances the transparency and traceability of cross-border payments |
| TECH3 | Technological tools have significantly reduced fraud cases in cross-border transactions |
| Cross-border payment fraud (FRAUD) | |
| FRAUD1 | Our bank has experienced at least one incident of cross-border payment fraud in the past three years |
| FRAUD2 | Losses from cross-border fraud are significant compared with domestic transactions |
| FRAUD3 | Most fraud incidents occur due to internal control weaknesses or governance gaps |
| Fraud prevention effectiveness (PREV) | |
| PREV1 | The bank's governance mechanisms effectively prevent and mitigate fraud in cross-border payments |
| PREV2 | Cooperation with regulators and correspondent banks enhances fraud prevention |
| PREV3 | Our fraud detection system is effective in identifying suspicious cross-border transfers |

Note: All items were measured using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”).