Hadri Kusuma

Indonesia is a country with the largest Muslim population in the world. However, since the Islamic banks were being established in Indonesia for about 20 years, their market share only accounts for about 5% in the Indonesian banking system. Muslim participations in using Islamic bank are relatively low. This study expands the Theory of Planned Behavior by adding the variables of religiosity and self-efficacy. Previous studies have not examined this new expanded model to analyze customers who participated in using the saving Islamic bank’s products and services. Based on 220 Islamic bank consumers who participated in the study, the study indicated that questionnaires about religiosity and self-efficacy had good external validity and could be adapted for the Indonesian culture context. The most interesting finding was that the religiosity variable strongly enhanced the use of Islamic banks. Similarly, this study found that the self-efficacy variable improved an intention of customers to participate in the Islamic banking system. This paper also discusses the implications of the findings and recommendations for future studies.

Existing research on the influence of motivation on an honest budget has overlooked the roles of certain dark personality traits, management control, and perceived fairness. This study aims to explore the moderating role of Machiavellianism, management control, and fairness in the relationship between internal and external motivation and honest budget reports. This paper comprised two experiments that evaluated the main effect of motivation and moderator effects of the above factors. The first experiment involved 72 graduate students from various Indonesian universities studying accounting or financial management, and the second experiment included 261 undergraduate students from similar fields. Participants were divided into internal and external motivation groups, further randomized into fairness and management control groups, creating eight distinct groups. Each group received a specific scenario corresponding to their allocated group. The results demonstrated that internal motivation had a stronger influence on honest reporting than external motivation (F (1, 257) = 60.36, p < 0.001). However, Machiavellianism weakened this relationship (F (3, 257) = 6.24, p < 0.05). Under complete management control and perceived fairness scenarios, individuals driven by internal motivation reported budget more honestly compared to those with external motivation group under basic management control and perceived unfairness scenarios (F (4, 253) = 4.95, p < 0.001). This analysis contributes to understanding honest budget reports by distinguishing between internal and external motivations and recognizing the moderating roles of Machiavellianism, management control, and fairness. These insights could help organizations design effective budgeting systems and control mechanisms to reduce budgetary slack and improve performance.