Gender diversity and firm value: a study on boards of public manufacturing firms in Indonesia

  • Received June 7, 2017;
    Accepted September 6, 2017;
    Published November 8, 2017
  • Author(s)
    Syamsudin Syamsudin , Erna Setiany , Sajidah Sajidah
  • DOI
    http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.15(3-1).2017.11
  • Article Info
    Volume 15 2017, Issue #3, pp. 276-284
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    8 articles
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This study aims to analyze the effect of gender diversity in both the Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors, as well as the effect of education background of the President Commissioner on the firm value. Gender diversity is measured from the proportion of women in Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors, while the education background is measured by the education background of the President Commissioner. In this research, the firm value is measured by Tobins Q.
The sample used in this study consist of 70 manufacturing companies listed in Indonesian Stock Exchange in the year 2012. This study employs multiple linear regression to draw the research results.
The analysis results show that gender diversity in both the Board of Commissioners and Board of Directors significantly affects firm value. On the contrary, the education background of the President Commissioner does not affect firm value. This result support the argument that diversity of boards will, through various ways, affect firm financial value in the long and short term.

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    • Table 1. Sample Selection
    • Table 2. Descriptive statistic
    • Table 3. Results
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