Inflation targeting and central bank independence: Do legal origins play a role?
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DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.21(2).2026.04
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Article InfoVolume 21 2026, Issue #2, pp. 50-63
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Type of the article: Research Article
Abstract
Central bank independence is widely recognized as a precondition for launching inflation targeting, but there is no empirical support for this. While actual independence of monetary institutions is key for the effective implementation of this monetary regime, formal reforms have been implemented extremely unevenly both over time and across countries. Legal origins may affect different institutional paths of central bank independence strengthening during the adoption of inflation targeting across countries. Applying a t-test, panel regression, and difference-in-difference based event-study analysis, we show a strong statistically significant distance between levels of central bank independence across Common Law and Civil Law countries with inflation targeting. Civil Law countries perform with higher central bank independence; they are more likely to strengthen it before inflation targeting launch and continue to reform the central bank’s legislation toward greater autonomy after the introduction of this monetary regime. These results confirm that Legal origins matter for central bank independence. More formally oriented Civil Law coexists with relevant legislation changes. While less formally oriented Common Law may not require changes in legislation to implement a monetary regime grounded on central bank independence, in essence. Such results help explain weak empirical arguments for strengthening central bank independence as a precondition for inflation targeting, given the structural heterogeneity of countries determined by legal tradition.
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JEL Classification (Paper profile tab)E02, E58, F15, F45
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References45
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Tables2
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Figures5
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- Figure 1. Central bank independence during IT launch by type of law, 7-year window
- Figure 2. Event-study (TWFE) – Civil law countries (without controls)
- Figure 3. Event-study (TWFE) – Common law countries (without controls)
- Figure 4. Event-study (TWFE + controls) – Civil law countries
- Figure 5. Event-study (TWFE + controls) – Common law
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- Table 1. Test results of the base (1) and augmented (2) TWFE models
- Table А1. IT countries grouped by legal system (Common Law vs Civil Law)
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