Shareholders’ activism as a moderator of the relationship between corporate governance and return on investment
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DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.16(4).2019.29
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Article InfoVolume 16 2019, Issue #4, pp. 342-351
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The purpose of shareholders’ involvement in the process of governance is to add corporate value and achieve better governance and firm performance (FP). However, corporate governance (CG) practices can vary from country to country and change over time. This study examines the moderating influence of shareholders’ activism (SA) on the CG effectiveness – FP relationship in non-financial companies listed in the Libyan Stock Market between 2007 and 2016. CG effectiveness was the independent variable and consisted of five dimensions: board of directors, monitoring committee, audit committee, nomination and compensation committee, and ownership. Leverage, firm age and firm size were used as control variables. Return on investment was used to assess the corporate performance. SA was tested as a moderating variable using the interactive regression models. The study found out that the CG effectiveness is positively and significantly related to return on investment (beta = 0.608, p < 0.01). This relationship was strengthened by SA (R2 = 0.053, P < 0.05). Overall, the study shows that SA boosts the relationship between CG and FP in the Libyan Stock Market.
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JEL Classification (Paper profile tab)G34, G38, M14
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References62
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Tables2
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Figures0
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- Table 1. Definitions/measurement of the variables and data sources
- Table 2. The results of the multivariate weighted least-squares regression analysis of four steps
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