Corporate governance and financial distress: Moderating role of firm complexity in an emerging economy
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Received November 6, 2024;Accepted February 13, 2025;Published February 21, 2025
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Author(s)Link to ORCID Index: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7914-7563
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DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.22(1).2025.22
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Article InfoVolume 22 2025, Issue #1, pp. 288-298
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Corporate governance has been widely applied in developed countries to promote accountability, transparency, and efficiency within corporations. In Vietnam, as the country transitions toward integrating international standards, corporate governance has become an emerging and critical area of focus. Therefore, this study aims to examine the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and corporate financial distress. The study utilizes the dataset of about 500 listed companies in the Vietnam stock exchange during 2014–2022. Feasible generalized least squares regression (FGLS) is employed to account for the heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation problems. Regression results show that frequent board meetings and more gender-diverse boards improve corporate financial health, while an increase in board members and duality roles have negative effects. Duality is often associated with increased agency problems, inefficient capital usage, and higher risk levels that reduce financial health. However, the impact is different in complex firms measured by book-to-market ratio and operating cycles. In complex firms, duality proves valuable by providing unified leadership and enabling active, clear management strategies. This can be explained by the fact that clear and flexible strategies outweigh the benefits of separation between the chairman and Chief Executive Officer.
Acknowledgment
The author gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the Banking Academy of Vietnam.
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JEL Classification (Paper profile tab)G34, G33, G32
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References48
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Tables7
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Figures0
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- Table 1. Calculation of the variables
- Table 2. Descriptive statistics
- Table 3. Pairwise correlations
- Table 4. Baseline regression
- Table 5. Summary statistics: mean, median, and standard deviation by firm size
- Table 6. Regression with complexity measurement (d_mtb)
- Table 7. Regression with dummy reflecting complexity measurement: d_cycle
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Does board composition have an impact on CSR reporting?
Problems and Perspectives in Management Volume 15, 2017 Issue #2 pp. 19-35 Views: 4631 Downloads: 1734 TO CITE АНОТАЦІЯCorporate social responsibility (CSR) reporting plays a key role in management control, particularly in light of the increased demand for non-financial reporting after the financial crisis of 2008–2009. This literature review evaluates 47 empirical studies that concentrate on the influence of several board composition variables on the quantity and quality of CSR reporting. The author briefly introduces the research framework that underpins current empirical studies in this field. This is followed by a discussion of the main variables of board composition: (1) committees (audit and CSR committees), (2) board independence, (3) board expertise, (4) CEO duality, (5) board diversity (gender and foreign diversity), (6) board activity, and (7) board size. The author, then, summarizes the key findings, discusses the limitations of the existing research and offers useful recommendations for researchers, firm practice and regulators.
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Corporate governance and financial performance: an empirical analysis of selected multinational firms in Nigeria
Gideon Tayo Akinleye , Odunayo Olarewaju, Bamikole Samson Fajuyagbe doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.17(1).2019.02
Problems and Perspectives in Management Volume 17, 2019 Issue #1 pp. 11-18 Views: 3593 Downloads: 586 TO CITE АНОТАЦІЯThis study focused on corporate governance and performance of selected Nigerian multinational firms from 2012 to 2016. Specifically, the study focused on the effect of board size, activism and committee activism on return on asset and firm growth rate. Secondary data collected from four multinational firms were analyzed via static panel estimation techniques. While board size and board activism exerted significant negative impact on return on asset, committee activism exerted insignificant impact. The results of the study further showed that board size and board activism exert insignificant negative impact on firm’s growth rate, while committee activism insignificantly spurs firm’s growth rate. Decisively, discoveries from this study reflect that corporate governance has significant negative impact on return on asset, but has insignificant influence on the growth rate of Nigerian multinational firms. Based on these findings, the authors recommended that corporate governance dynamics in firms world over should be reconsidered, such that it gives credence to more than just numbers of persons or meetings held, but the main reasons and deliberations in such meetings. It was also recommended that excessive increase in magnitude or frequency of meetings held by board of directors cum committee should be avoided.
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Impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting quality: a study of Indian GAAP and Indian Accounting Standards
Faozi A. Almaqtari, Abdulwahid Abdullah Hashed
, Mohd Shamim
, Waleed M. Al-ahdal doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.18(4).2020.01
Problems and Perspectives in Management Volume 18, 2020 Issue #4 pp. 1-13 Views: 3237 Downloads: 655 TO CITE АНОТАЦІЯThe present study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting quality under Indian GAAP and Indian Accounting Standards (Ind. AS). A sample of 97 companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange is selected. Corporate governance mechanisms have been considered as independent variables, and financial reporting quality is the dependent variable. Corporate governance is measured by board effectiveness (board size, independence, diligence, and expertise), audit committee attributes (size, independence, diligence, and expertise), foreign ownership, and audit quality. Descriptive statistics, correlation, and OLS regression are conducted to estimate the results. The study results reveal that board characteristics and audit committee attributes, except for audit committee diligence, have a significant effect on financial reporting quality. However, the impact of board diligence and audit committee attributes is negative. Foreign ownership has no contribution to financial reporting quality, but audit quality has a significant effect. The findings of the study have considerable implications for regulators, policymakers, managers, investors, analysts, and academicians. More emphasis should be given to compliance with Ind. AS, and an oversight body for compliance with Ind. AS should be established.
Acknowledgment
This publication was supported by Deanship of Scientific Research, Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University, Alkharj, Saudi Arabia.