Hansol Lee

This study examines the effect of foreign directors in the board of directors on the monitoring function by analyzing the association between foreign directors and opportunistic financial reporting. The authors address this question by examining the effect of the foreign directors in the board on firms’ discretionary accruals and book-tax difference. The researchers analyze by using Korean firm data for the years 2001–2014 as Korea is one of the few countries that nepotism is strong within the board, providing the ideal setting to analyze the effect of foreign directors on the monitoring function of the board. The authors find that foreign directors have a positive effect on the monitoring function of the board, as discretionary accruals and book-tax differences of firms with foreign directors are lower than those without foreign directors. Further, the researchers find that the positive effect of foreign directors on the monitoring function is more pronounced if foreign directors are independent directors or expertise in accounting or finance. Overall, the findings support the view that foreign directors in the board increase the board diversity, which increases the independence of the board and so the monitoring function.

This study aims to examine the effect of product market competition on a firm’s investments in research and development (R&D) and how this effect varies depending on the firm’s internal corporate governance. This study employs the regression method to analyze the association between product market competition and a firm’s R&D investment. Since product market competition works effectively as an external corporate governance mechanism that reduces agency problems and information asymmetry, this study hypothesizes that a competitive product market promotes R&D investments. Using 11,560 firm-year observations of Korean listed firms for 2001–2020, this study finds a positive association between product market competition and R&D investment. The result also shows this association is more pronounced for firms with weak internal corporate governance mechanisms. Furthermore, additional analysis shows that the effect of product market competition on a firm’s R&D investment is stronger for firms in the low-tech industry. This study provides new insights on the inconclusive association between product market competition and a firm’s R&D investment and practical implications that product market competition drives firms to invest in R&D.

Acknowledgements
This work was supported by the Gachon University research fund of 2021.(GCU-202103550001)

This study aims to investigate the relationship between related party transactions and a firm’s investment in research and development (R&D), as well as the moderating effect of a firm’s financial health on such a relationship. The study applies a fixed-effect panel regression model with a sample of 13,619 Korean listed firms for the period from 2001 to 2020. The results indicate that related party transactions significantly and positively influence a firm’s R&D investment at the 1% level for the study period. Specifically, when related party transactions are divided into operating and non-operating, the results show that only non-operating related party transactions significantly and positively affect firms’ investment in R&D. Moreover, findings report that the effect of related party transactions is stronger for firms with financial distress, lower cash holdings, and in the high-tech industry. The results imply that related party transactions promote a firm’s R&D investment, which is one of the primary business investments that create a firm’s competitive advantage and value. Moreover, the results propose that related party transactions should be carefully evaluated when accessing the firm’s investment behavior.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between pay disparity and a company’s investment inefficiency, and to explore the moderating influence of investment in internal control personnel on this relationship. The global concern over pay disparity has intensified as executive compensation soars to unparalleled heights, while employee wages remain static. Utilizing a fixed-effect regression model and analyzing 5,407 observations from Korean listed companies between 2018 and 2020, the study shows a positive association between pay disparity (coef = 0.034, p-value < 0.01) and investment inefficiency, with pay disparity increasing the level of investment inefficiency by fostering overinvestment. Furthermore, the study shows that the interaction term between pay disparity and quantitative (coef = –0.246, p-value < 0.01) and qualitative (coef = –2.104, p-value < 0.01) investments in internal control personnel is negative and significant, indicating that the positive link between pay disparity and investment inefficiency is lessened when there is a higher quantitative and qualitative investment in internal control personnel. By offering a more comprehensive understanding of the conflicting evidence about the impact of pay disparity and the role of investment in internal control personnel in moderating the negative effect of pay disparity on investment efficiency, this study contributes to the existing literature. The findings of the study suggest that companies aiming to minimize investment inefficiency should consider not only addressing pay disparity but also investing in internal control personnel.

Although internal control systems in firms aim to provide reasonable assurance regarding objectives related to operations, reporting, and compliance, research focusing on operational efficiency is limited. This study investigates the impact of both quantitative and qualitative investments in internal control personnel on a firm’s operational efficiency. Utilizing a fixed-effect regression model, the Heckman (1979) two-stage model, and a two-stage least squares procedure, this study analyzes 4,471 firm-year observations from Korean listed firms from 2018 to 2020. The findings indicate a positive association between investment in internal control personnel and operational efficiency. This relationship remains robust even under sensitivity tests and concerns of potential endogeneity, as confirmed by the Heckman and two-stage least squares models. Specifically, the Heckman model shows that the ratio of the number of employees (coef = 0.023, t-value = 5.20) and certified public accountants (coef = 0.256, t-value = 5.43) responsible for internal control is positively associated with operational efficiency. Average work experience (coef = 0.002, t-value = 1.84) of internal control personnel is also positively related to operational efficiency. This study provides empirical evidence for the significance of investing in internal control personnel to boost operational efficiency and suggests that firms should consider both quantitative and qualitative aspects of internal control.

The management of an entity faces diverse decisions concerned with corporate operations and financing choices. Investigating various factors affecting a company’s cash holdings provides valuable insights into the decision-making processes of an organization. This study examines the effect of Anti-Takeover Provisions (ATPs), Managerial Overconfidence, and their interaction on the level of an entity’s cash holdings. Conducting a regression analysis, this study examines 3,409 firm-year observations from Korean listed entities covering 2011 to 2018. Results reveal that anti-takeover provisions positively influence an entity’s cash holdings (coefficient = 0.464, t-stat value = 7.83). Additionally, managerial overconfidence negatively affects cash holdings (coefficient = –0.140, t-stat value = –2.77). Furthermore, the interaction between anti-takeover provisions and managerial overconfidence significantly influences cash holdings (coefficient = –0.402, t-stat value = –3.46), especially in firms employing specific provisions such as supermajority vote requirements for executive dismissal (coefficient = –0.445, t-stat value = –2.73), issuance of convertible preferred stock (coefficient = –0.341, t-stat value = –1.76), and golden parachutes (coefficient = –0.715, t-stat value = –3.02). This study provides empirical evidence on how anti-takeover provisions and managerial traits influence corporate cash reserves. The study offers valuable insights for regulators, investors, and corporate management. It also emphasizes prudent cash management, urging firms, especially those with anti-takeover provisions and overconfident management, to reconsider financial policies to mitigate risks associated with aggressive decision-making.

This study examines the effect of corporate governance on a company’s cash holdings, focusing on a firm’s compliance levels with core corporate governance indicators as outlined in the corporate governance report. Utilizing a random effect generalized least squares (GLS) regression model, this study evaluates 812 firm-year observations from Korean publicly traded companies covering the period 2018 to 2021. The results indicate that companies with robust governance structures generally maintain lower levels of cash holdings (coefficient = –0.0263, p-value = 0.044), corroborating the flexibility hypothesis. Moreover, higher compliance levels with governance matters concerning shareholder protection (coefficient = –0.0388, p-value = 0.090) and board of directors (coefficient = –0.0512, p-value = 0.052) are associated with reduced cash holdings. Further analysis, accounting for a firm’s organizational capital, underscores that the inverse relationship between corporate governance and cash holdings is more pronounced in organizations with lesser organizational capital (coefficient = –0.0548, p-value < 0.01). This study contributes empirical evidence showing that strict compliance with core corporate governance indicators, indicative of strong corporate governance, substantially affects a firm’s cash management. Additionally, this study offers valuable insights for regulatory authorities and investors and enhances the existing body of knowledge on the interplay between corporate governance and cash holdings.