The effect of Corporate Governance Information (CGI) on banks’ reporting performance

This paper is the first research attempt that investigates the impact of a large number of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of Greek banks,employing widely accepted in the literature of corporate governance econometric models. Results indicate that system GMM models are more suitable methodological tools than pooledOLS and fixed effects models to address well-known econometric problems, such as endogeneity, simultaneity and unobserved heterogeneity of individual banks. The findings, as derived from the application of GMM models, imply that increasing the board size and the number of independent directors can both have positive impact on the performance of Greek banks, but only up to a certain point. Thus, bank efficiency will increase as board size and the proportion of independent directors grow up to a point where these relationships hit a maximum from which bank performance decreases. Our multi-model estimations failed to trace any significant contribution of the number of female and foreign directors on the performance of Greek banks. Finally, the dual appointment of a CEO as Chairman appears to affect negatively two out of four proxies of bank performance. Overall, the results provide support for the positive impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the performance of Greek banks. The significance of these findings increases, considering that the period under study (2008-2014) is marked by high market volatility and uncertainty due to the well-known debt crisis that plagues Greece since the beginning of 2008.

To verify if female directors on the bank’s board play a role in managing bank stability, this paper applies a multi-threshold model to quarterly data from 26 Taiwanese commercial banks over the 2002–2018 period to find the factors that influence bank financial stability and to examine how female board directorship affects it. The empirical results suggest that women on the board do play a guarding role in a bank’s financial soundness when banks reach a high debt ratio regime. The influence of female directors on the capital adequacy ratio is positive for banks with a debt ratio higher than 92.69%, and for non-performing loans it is positive within the regime of the debt ratio 90.71% ≤ τ < 95.39%.
In particular, it has been found that the value of total assets is a factor that positively affects a bank’s financial soundness, which supports the “too big to fail” theory for banks with high total assets and debt ratios. Revenue has the opposite effect on financial soundness when it negatively affects the capital adequacy ratio and positively affects non-performing loans. A larger board size reduces banks’ financial soundness, which is contrary to the higher proportion of women on the board of directors, which generally contributes to the financial stability of the bank.

The main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of board structure and ownership structure on capital structure of Shariah-compliant firms and Non-Shariah-compliant firms in Indonesia. The study used the Generalized Method of Moments to analyze the relationship by applying 2,739 data observations of non-financial companies registered on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. This study uses commissionaire size, director size, female director, female commissionaire, independent director, and independent commissionaire as proxies for board structure, and ownership concentration and government ownership for ownership structure. The results showed that for Sharia-compliant firms, the relevant determinants are all variables of board structure and ownership structure except independent director. For Sharia non-compliant firms, the only non-relevant determinants are female director and commissionaire size. Interestingly, most of the board structure variables in Shariah compliant firms indicate a strong negative relationship with capital structure of firms (except total commissionaire). This may indicate that board structure of Shariah compliant firms strives to lower the leverage level of the firm. This may also indicate that most managers of Shariah compliant firms are risk averse.