Dodd-Frank and risk-taking: reputation impact in banks

  • Published March 24, 2017
  • Author(s)
    Ezelda Swanepoel
    ORCID , Ja’nel Esterhuysen ,
    Gary van Vuuren
    ORCID , Ronnie Lotriet
  • DOI
    http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.12(1).2017.04
  • Article Info
    Volume 12 2017, Issue #1, pp. 36-43
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This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License

The banking industry plays a significant role in both the financial system and economy as a whole. By 2012, the US banking system owned US $14.45 trillion in assets. However, the importance of the banking system stretches beyond its mere size. Numerous studies have indicated that the health of this sector has significant effects on overall economic activity, as well as the size and persistence of economic cycles. For the purposes of this paper, the researchers measured the correlation between current legislation, risk-taking, market value, and reputation. This was performed by calcula-ting Z-scores to determine bank risk-taking. The Z-scores were correlated to market value to determine its impact. Reputable firm behavior was used to determine the correlation between market value and reputation. The statistical package for Social Sciences was used to perform ANOVA analysis of share value and Z-scores. A literature review was conducted to determine the reputational impact. It was determined that current legislation might have a desired result on risk-taking, that risk-taking might not have an impact on market value, and that reputation might have an impact on market value.

Keywords: reputation, banking industry, financial system, economic activity, Z-scores, legislation, risk-taking.
JEL Classification: C21, G18, G21, G32, G38, K23

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    • Table 2. Descriptive Statistics from 2010 to 2014
    • Table 3. Regression and ANOVA of Z-scores on market value
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Banks and Bank Systems
Banks and Bank Systems