Jan Walters Kruger
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3 publications
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An Interest Rate Commission Agent Banking System
Ameha Tefera Tessema , Jan Walters Kruger -
Testing performance of an interest rate commission agent banking system (AIRCABS)
Ameha Tefera Tessema , Jan Walters Kruger doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/bbs.12(3).2017.09Banks and Bank Systems Volume 12, 2017 Issue #3 pp. 113-141
Views: 1064 Downloads: 210 TO CITE АНОТАЦІЯThis paper sought to analyze data and interpret statistical results in testing the performance of an interest rate commission agent banking system. Primary and secondary data were collected from banking industry in Ethiopia to test the research hypotheses, credit risk and liquidity crunch have no impact on AIRCABS, investor loan funding has a positive impact on profitability and sustainability of AIRCABS and discrete market deposit interest rate incentive has a positive impact on stable deposit mobilization in a bank. To test the hypothesis, statistical tools such as Cronbach’s alpha, Kuder-Richardson (KR-20), canonical correlation and multinomial logistic regression were used. The result showed that credit risk and liquidity crunch have no effect on an interest rate commission agent banking system, investor loan funding has a significant strong relationship with profitability and sustainability of AIRCABS and discrete market deposit interest rate incentive has also a significant strong relationship with stable deposit mobilization. This led to a conclusion that an interest rate commission agent banking system (AIRCABS) model is viable and reliable.
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The impact of transforming bank advisory services to borrowers on non-interest revenue generation
Banks and Bank Systems Volume 12, 2017 Issue #4 pp. 203-210
Views: 880 Downloads: 163 TO CITE АНОТАЦІЯThe challenges of revenue generation by banks are evident if one considers the accusations labelled against the banks of aggressive lending (Archaya & Naqvi, 2012), which basically centers on the pursuit of profits with minimum regard to risk management. If not read or if read in passing, loan terms can be used to destroy the reputation of banks when accusations of predatory loans surface. It is argued here that even if understood at the time of signing the acceptance of the loan, there is no guarantee that the terms are still top of mind of borrowers, especially those who borrow for a long term. Banks can use their advisory skills to periodically take borrowers through loan terms, confirm understanding, detect any wanton behaviors (WB) from borrowers’ financial activities that go against financial astuteness and may jeopardize repayment capabilities and offer advice on practices that are not counter to repayment capabilities. Banks can mitigate the challenges in interest income generation, particularly from a default point of view by periodically engaging borrowers to specifically advice on behavioral issues that manifest themselves in financial levers. Since borrowers stand to gain immeasurable value out of these engagements, banks can justifiably levy borrower advisory service fees (BASF) and wanton hazard fee (WHF). The authors show, through the application of the BASF and WHF, the potential income banks can generate. Using the BASF and WHF as sources of non-interest income, the potential benefit taking into account the credit loss as a function of BASF accruing to the bank is established.