Share pledging and accounting conservatism in India: The role of mandatory disclosure and regulatory oversight
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Received December 29, 2025;Accepted April 9, 2026;Published June 15, 2026
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Author(s)Rohith RadhakrishnanLink to ORCID Index: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5402-8269
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E. GeethaLink to ORCID Index: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1346-7641
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DOIhttp://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.23(2).2026.29
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Article InfoVolume 23 2026, Issue #2, pp. 389-399
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Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License
Type of the article: Research Article
Abstract
Promoters’ share pledging represents a serious corporate governance problem in highly concentrated ownership environments, with substantial implications for firms’ financial reporting integrity and investors’ interests. This study examines the relationship between share pledging and accounting conservatism while evaluating the effectiveness of SEBI’s 2019 disclosure mandate (Regulation 31(1)) in curbing opportunistic reporting. Utilizing a panel of 1,933 Indian non-financial firms from 2015 to 2022, we employ a fixed-effects model and a difference-in-differences framework to analyze an accrual-based proxy of conservatism. The empirical findings indicate a positive relationship between promoters’ pledging and the accrual-based proxy, with firm-level (FL_Pledge) and promoter-level (PL_Pledge) pledging coefficients of 0.072 (t = 5.72) and 0.044 (t = 6.43), respectively, confirming that pledging firms engage in less conservative reporting. The difference-in-differences analysis reveals that the 2019 regulatory change reduced opportunistic reporting, as evidenced by a significant negative interaction coefficient of –0.010 (t = –2.99). Furthermore, the results show that post-regulation, the treated group’s association with the accrual proxy remains positive at 0.014 (t = 3.16), suggesting a shift towards more conservative accounting practices following mandatory disclosure. These results indicate that India’s disclosure-led regulatory frameworks serve as an alternative to the restrictive pledging caps observed in other emerging economies.
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JEL Classification (Paper profile tab)C33, M40, M41, M48
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References41
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Tables5
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Figures1
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- Figure 1. Conceptual framework illustrating the relationships examined in the study
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- Table 1. Variable definitions
- Table 2. Descriptive statistics
- Table 3. Correlation matrix
- Table 4. The impact of promoters’ share-pledging on accounting conservatism
- Table 5. The impact of regulation change on the association between share-pledging and accounting conservatism
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Conceptualization
Rohith Radhakrishnan, E. Geetha
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Data curation
Rohith Radhakrishnan
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Formal Analysis
Rohith Radhakrishnan, E. Geetha
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Funding acquisition
Rohith Radhakrishnan, E. Geetha
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Methodology
Rohith Radhakrishnan
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Resources
Rohith Radhakrishnan
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Software
Rohith Radhakrishnan
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Visualization
Rohith Radhakrishnan
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Writing – original draft
Rohith Radhakrishnan
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Project administration
E. Geetha
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Supervision
E. Geetha
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Validation
E. Geetha
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Writing – review & editing
E. Geetha
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Conceptualization
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The impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on the Indian stock market – A sectoral analysis
Investment Management and Financial Innovations Volume 18, 2021 Issue #3 pp. 334-346 Views: 9992 Downloads: 4105 TO CITE АНОТАЦІЯThis paper aims to examine the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on Indian firms listed on the NSE and analyze its impact on various sectors. In addition, a sub-sample analysis based on market capitalization was performed to understand the effect of size during extreme events. The sample consisted of 1,335 firms listed on the NSE India. A standard event study outlined by Brown and Warner (1985) was employed to analyze the price impact on the COVID-19 outbreak. The event windows from -10 days to +10 days were selected. The estimation window is 250 days. The Nifty 50 has been chosen as a proxy for market return. The sample firms witnessed a negative impact of the COVID-19 outbreak with a negative CAAR in different event windows. In addition, various sectors are classified according their responsiveness towards the COVID-19 outbreak into three groups: highly negatively affected, moderately negatively affected, and slightly negatively affected. The paper also points out that the pandemic substantially affects the above-median market capitalized firms than the below-median market capitalized firms, which contradicts the size effect phenomenon. The results assist shareholders in managing their portfolios and mitigate the systematic risk of their investments during extreme events such as a pandemic, wars, and others. This study is the first comprehensive analysis of the impact of the COVID-19 outbreak on different sectors in India. It is also the first study to investigate the size effect anomalies during extreme events.
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Impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting quality: a study of Indian GAAP and Indian Accounting Standards
Faozi A. Almaqtari
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Abdulwahid Abdullah Hashed
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Mohd Shamim
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Waleed M. Al-ahdal
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/ppm.18(4).2020.01
Problems and Perspectives in Management Volume 18, 2020 Issue #4 pp. 1-13 Views: 5376 Downloads: 1141 TO CITE АНОТАЦІЯThe present study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on financial reporting quality under Indian GAAP and Indian Accounting Standards (Ind. AS). A sample of 97 companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange is selected. Corporate governance mechanisms have been considered as independent variables, and financial reporting quality is the dependent variable. Corporate governance is measured by board effectiveness (board size, independence, diligence, and expertise), audit committee attributes (size, independence, diligence, and expertise), foreign ownership, and audit quality. Descriptive statistics, correlation, and OLS regression are conducted to estimate the results. The study results reveal that board characteristics and audit committee attributes, except for audit committee diligence, have a significant effect on financial reporting quality. However, the impact of board diligence and audit committee attributes is negative. Foreign ownership has no contribution to financial reporting quality, but audit quality has a significant effect. The findings of the study have considerable implications for regulators, policymakers, managers, investors, analysts, and academicians. More emphasis should be given to compliance with Ind. AS, and an oversight body for compliance with Ind. AS should be established.
Acknowledgment
This publication was supported by Deanship of Scientific Research, Prince Sattam Bin Abdulaziz University, Alkharj, Saudi Arabia. -
The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on retailer performance: empirical evidence from India
Amgad S.D. Khaled
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Nabil Mohamed Alabsy
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Eissa A. Al-Homaidi
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Abdulmalek M.M. Saeed
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/im.16(4).2020.11
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