The effects of managerial ownership, leverage, dividend policy in minimizing agency problem

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The research intends to minimize agency conflict through causality effects of managerial ownership, leverage, and dividend policy, where agency conflict is still interesting issue to discuss, as it concerns the principals’ and agents’ interests. The research covers 33 go-public manufacturers in Indonesia Stock Exchange. It involves 198 samples in the period 2010–2015. It applies saturation sampling and balanced panel data. For analysis model, it applies Granger bidirectional/simultaneity analysis, with variables of managerial ownership, leverage and dividend policy.The research shows that: 1) there is no bidirectional causality between managerial ownership and leverage (5%); 2) there is no bidirectional causality between managerial ownership and dividend policy (5%); 3) there is no bidirectional causality between leverage and dividend policy (10%).

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    • Table 1. Description of managerial ownership, leverage, dividend policy
    • Table 2. Testing model with AIC
    • Table 3. Granger causality test results