The impact of executive remuneration on risk-taking in the banking industry

  • Released On
    Tuesday, 23 August 2016
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  • DOI
    http://dx.doi.org/10.21511/imfi.13(3).2016.10
  • Article Info
    Volume 13 2016, Issue #3, pp. 110-117
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In the aftermath of the credit crisis of 2007-2009, there was considerable public frustration with regard to executive remuneration, particularly in the banking industry. Consequently, the need for regulated remuneration practices became essential. For this purpose, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) aims to align risk and reward by encouraging good risk management and discouraging excessive risk-taking. This paper aims to demonstrate the correlation between the health of the banking industry and economic activity, as well as the change in executive remuneration pre and post the credit crisis. In addition, the paper aims to measure the correlation between executive remuneration in the form of cash and equity, and risk-taking. The unique features of banking emphasized the interconnectedness to the broader economy. The statistical package for social sciences (SPSS) was used to perform these analyses. It was found that as executive remuneration in the form of cash increased, risk-taking decreased. In addition, as executive remuneration in the form of equity decreased, risk-taking increased. In summary, the research points to the fact that executives have in fact been remunerated in terms of equity. However, the results indicate that this may not have enticed the executives to take on more risks

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