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AUTHORS	Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi Ibrahim Mohamed Shaker Ali
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Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi (UAE), **Ibrahim Mohamed Shaker Ali** (Saudi Arabia)

LEGAL SAFEGUARDS AGAINST MARKET RUMORS IN UAE SECURITIES: A COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW STUDY

Abstract

Market rumors distort price discovery and investor confidence, especially in high-velocity trading environments. This study evaluates how the UAE commercial and securities law protects transactions against market-moving rumors and compares the UAE's approach with that of the US, UK, and EU. Using a doctrinal-comparative design, it analyzes statutes, exchange rules, supervisory guidance, and published actions (2019–2025). Illustrative enforcement items and operational timelines are also mapped (e.g., early-morning disclosure windows and short suspensions). UAE provisions prohibiting misleading statements/manipulation converge with international standards. Exchange operations create same-day rebuttal discipline (e.g., 09:00 disclosure with a 09:00–09:30 suspension lever if missed), while public sanctions have reached AED 5,000,000, alongside aggregate and individual penalties. Compared with benchmarks, the UAE exhibits faster initial issuer statements but less explicit safe harbors for rapid rebuttals and narrower private redress pathways. The framework materially aligns with leading jurisdictions. Codifying explicit rebuttal timelines, introducing calibrated safe harbors for good-faith rapid clarifications, and clarifying interfaces for private actions would improve predictability and investor outcomes without weakening administrative deterrence.

Keywords market rumors, disclosure, market abuse, enforcement, UAE, investor protection, sanctions, litigation

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Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi, Ph.D., Associate Professor of Commercial Law and Maritime, Umm Al Quwain University, United Arab Emirates. (Corresponding author)

Ibrahim Mohamed Shaker Ali, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, College of Administration and Humanities, Department of Law, Mustaqbal University, Saudi Arabia.

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INTRODUCTION

Unverified market rumors can disrupt price discovery, widen bid-ask spreads, and trigger short-lived but material mispricings that are costly to unwind. In markets characterized by rapid information diffusion and active retail participation, even a few hours of uncertainty can catalyze abnormal returns and volume surges as traders react to signals that may later prove false. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) exemplifies this high-velocity environment: a growing issuer base, cross-listings, and vibrant social-media discussion create fertile ground for speculation to propagate before authoritative clarification reaches the tape. Under such pressures, local market practice has evolved toward tight operational disciplines – most notably early-morning disclosure windows and short suspension intervals when issuers do not respond in time – aimed at compressing rumor persistence and restoring orderly trading.

Yet difficult boundary questions remain. Markets rely on forward-looking dialogue, but the dissemination of false or misleading statements can manufacture artificial prices. Issuers face the dual hazard of reacting too slowly and fueling disorderly markets or reacting too quickly and risking inaccuracies or selective disclosure. Exchanges must calibrate halts that stabilize order books without chilling legitimate communication, while supervisors weigh administrative enforcement against the informational benefits of rapid, good-faith clarifications. These tensions intensify dual-listed firms navigating heterogeneous rulebooks and investor expectations across jurisdictions. Clarifying where unverified talk ends and sanctionable conduct begins – and how timelines, rebuttal practices, and remedial pathways interact – remains central to safeguarding investor confidence, protecting transactional certainty, and ensuring that price formation reflects information rather than noise.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

The analysis refers to reiterated concepts, as well as various methodological techniques and law-making formats when carrying out comparative structural analyses of regulatory systems and enforcement procedures. We review work directly addressing rumors/misinformation in securities markets, issuer disclosure timing, supervisory enforcement, and UAE legal scholarship. Broader criminology and cybercrime sources are cited only where they inform rumor dissemination/enforcement. We avoid tangential domains unless they connect to market-moving statements. This review integrates criminal policy interventions and financial guideline structures with securities transaction faith insights in investors. Scholars explore studies to determine their strengths and weaknesses, their applicability to future research, and to identify areas of agreement and conflict, as well as gaps, to better frame study goals. Financial fraud in the securities market negatively affects investor confidence and market stability overall. Violations of trust during financial transactions lead to uncertainty, therefore lowering investor confidence. Ensuring sound legal protection is crucial in ensuring transparency and guarding market integrity. The article by Temirova (2024) addresses current regulatory problems in digital financial markets and algorithmic system trading, but it diverges from this paper, which is concerned with common securities fraud. The regulation needs to be developed to fit newer financial technological advancements. Aziza et al.'s (2023) results on preventing market manipulation through regulatory arrangements are in line with previous published research. Weak enforcement of emerging markets in Sub-Saharan Africa results in increased investor uncertainty as the UAE enforces stricter regulations to ensure investors.

Different scholarly studies show that cyber-money offenses are an emerging threat to the security market sector. The study evaluates Federal Decree-Law No. 34 of 2021 in its critique of (Alalawi & Alkrisheh, 2024; Vasiloi, 2023). Initial law protection mechanisms function well but need to be revised in the long term to effectively deal with recent cybercrime operations. Sinno et al. (2023) conduct an analysis that outlines the manner in which criminals adapt their financial criminal practices, including trade-based money laundering (TBML), to avoid legal measures. The two studies demonstrate the reality that financial markets need to have enforcement approaches that prevent problems rather than waiting for them to happen. Bakasov (2024) investigates financial market crimes through the lens of criminology to outline increasing digital financial crimes. The authors disagree on the importance of regulatory loopholes in TBML programs because they prioritize financial education and enhancing interagency cooperation to counter financial cybercrimes. According to them, the safety of digital markets depends on regulatory frameworks. The discussion reveals that financial market regulators need to implement countermeasures to digital criminality while coping with conventional financial scandals. Corporate criminality largely depends on stable financial markets. Al Akhdloriy et al. (2024) and Aldabousi (2022) illustrate how loopholes in financial regulation open the door to algorithmic trading deceit and facilitate stock price manipulation. Malek et al. (2023) suggest that a good response to corporate wrongdoing is absent in markets owing to the absence of proper regulatory control mechanisms. Wijeweera et al. (2024) uncovered that Abu Dhabi has stable markets owing to its cautious policies, whereas Dubai has unstable markets owing to its market-based strategy. Authors do not agree with others who push for corporate wrongdoing as the leading cause of market volatility in terms of policy differences. There must be more regulatory watchfulness and champions of sectoral financial regulation for China, emphasizing the use of adaptive

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mechanisms to prevent financial scams. Authors agree that comprehensive monitoring leads to more market stability, and this creates investor confidence.

Researchers conduct several studies to understand how economic stability is influenced by crime figures throughout the UAE. A study by Adela and Aldhaheri (2024) depicts that a rise in crime numbers deters domestic investment in Dubai since investors equate unstable economic situations with riskier signals. Researchers argue that the alignment of regulatory frameworks plays a bigger role in making investors more optimistic than the decline in crime rates. Although there are crime prevention studies, others clarify that liberalized financial regulations encourage investment even in dangerous environments. From the findings, it is indicated that market safety is not enough to encourage investments, but regulatory institutions must constantly be improved to enhance market stability and investor confidence. Market stability and investor confidence deteriorate due to financial crimes, like fraud, insider dealing, and algorithmic trading. The risks are reduced by robust regulatory frameworks, though unequal law enforcement continues to pose a large issue. The outburst of financial cybercrimes requires financial regulators to stay abreast of constant updates on their regulations in perpetuity. The ever-evolving nature of financial criminals requires immediate proactive cybersecurity countermeasures (Arnold, 2024; Abir, 2024). Market efficiency is negatively impacted owing to corporate criminal activity in algorithmic trading systems and plans to manipulate stock prices. Automated trading has improved the liquidity of markets but presents conditions for insider dealing and fraud that necessitate more personal regulatory supervision. Financial regulations must be dynamic, transparent, and enforceable. Actions suggest forward-looking and adaptable policies enhance investor confidence and reduce chances of financial crime (Wang et al., 2021; Aldabousi, 2022; Aldabousi, 2023; Joshi & Jassim, 2022).

The UAE criminal policy reflects a number of knowledge gaps in understanding the extent to which it can stop financial fraud and market manipulation, since there is little empirical research on its enforcement regime. It lacks loopholes where there are no international comparative studies and standards analyzing the UAE's modern regulatory performance against proper international benchmarks. Most commentators agree that existing studies do not incorporate digital financial offenses into traditional fraud examinations because each sector receives independent research. The present study evaluates the UAE criminal policy against market rumors in different aspects, including the examination of other jurisdictions' legislation and their contagious effects on financial sanctions on detention mechanisms, and computerized mechanisms for rumor monitoring and listed entities' compliance with disclosure protocols. This research achieves an in-depth financial regulation analysis to guarantee that lawmakers set new policies that effectively combat modern-day financial offenses. Any UAE market rumor control has kept pace with technology deployments that stay ahead of modern-day rumor dissemination trends. The Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) and market operators use artificial intelligence (AI) and natural language processing (NLP) to monitor information through their advanced market surveillance systems that cover traditional and social media messages. Sophisticated surveillance systems pick out emergent patterns of rumor activity in combination with anomalous information flows, which could be subjected to regulation (International Monetary Fund, 2023; Awad et al., 2025; Abdulla & Elshandidy, 2023). Firms are given controlled environments through the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) Innovation Testing License program to pilot new market integrity technology approaches. The new strategy looks to future demands by recognizing that regulatory success requires end-to-end innovations to manage new manipulation techniques.

The UAE now investigates the use of distributed ledger technologies (DLT) to market structure as a future improvement to combat rumors. Blockchain technology supports permanent monitoring of market-sensitive information, dispelling anonymous market manipulator protection, thus reshaping the cost-benefit analysis of rumor spreaders (Ilir et al., 2022; Alkatbi & Alkrisheh, 2024). Efforts to contain financial rumors have not stopped the current market imbalances that divert investors and price volatility increases. The aggressive regulatory strategy that the UAE adopted in a bid to fight market manipulation has unclear effects on preventing financial exploitation triggered by rumors. Given the rising importance of electronic communication in financial markets, to what degree are the existing policy effectiveness levels of UAE policies to limit securities transaction rumors relative to global industry standards?

Building on these themes, this study evaluates how the UAE commercial and securities law protects transactions against market-moving rumors and benchmarks the UAE's approach against the US, UK, and EU.

2. METHODOLOGY

This study uses a doctrinal-comparative approach (2019–2025 window) and a structured mapping of public actions/timelines. We define "market rumor," coding fields, and reliability checks; limits are noted (public records only). The doctrinal analysis interprets primary legal sources – statutes, implementing regulations, exchange rulebooks, supervisory guidance, and published decisions – while the comparative component benchmarks the UAE against the United States, United Kingdom, and European Union to identify convergences in definitions and duties and divergences in rebuttal timelines, safe harbors, and private redress. The period of observation is January 1, 2019 through June 30, 2025, a window chosen to capture post-COVID market microstructure shifts and recent supervisory updates germane to rumor control and issuer disclosure.

The document corpus consists of publicly accessible legal texts and regulatory outputs (including exchange announcements, administrative penalty notices, consultation papers, and FAQs) that address rumor dissemination, market manipulation, misleading disclosure, or issuer disclosure obligations; purely journalistic opinion, duplicate media reprints without primary references, and nonpublic memoranda were excluded. "Market rumor" is operationalized as an unverified market-moving statement, oral or written, capable of influencing price, volume, or liquidity from the perspective of a reasonable investor. For each enforcement item we coded rumor typology (transactional/event; performance/forecast; governance/insider; regulatory/permit; market-microstructure), trigger and venue (e.g., exchange announcement, social-media circulation, analyst/blog post), issuer response times from first public rumor trace to first official issuer statement (in hours or days) including whether a trading halt or suspension window was activated, supervisory action type and sanction size in AED together with any remedial orders or referrals, doctrinal elements of the violation and available defenses or safe harbors, and the presence of investor redress pathways.

Two researchers independently screened and extracted data; a 20% dual-coded sample targeted Cohen's $\kappa \geq 0.80$ for categorical fields and ±1 day tolerance for timeline variables, with disagreements resolved by rulebook-anchored adjudication, after which reconciled entries became canonical. From these records, indicators reported in the Results were derived: median and interquartile ranges for time to first issuer disclosure, frequencies of morning-disclosure compliance and halt/suspension activation, distributions of monetary fines (median, IQR, and maximum), counts of non-monetary measures, and a side-by-side comparative matrix of legal definitions, rebuttal expectations, safe-harbor language, and private actions. Analytical procedures proceeded in three passes: close reading and synthesis of legal elements culminating in a decision tree that tests when a statement qualifies as a prohibited rumor; descriptive statistics on timelines and sanctions summarized in tables and a time-strip figure; and a most-similar-systems comparison contrasting UAE provisions with US/UK/EU texts. Sensitivity checks re-computed timeliness metrics after excluding observations with ambiguous rumor onset, reported both means and medians to limit the influence of outlier fines, and validated issuer-response times against exchange timestamps when available.

The study is limited to public records and, therefore, may understate non-public supervisory engagements; to mitigate this, exchange announcements and official circulars were used to triangulate timelines and obligations. All subjects drawn from public sources involve no human subjects, and are documented in an accompanying coding dictionary and reproducible source checklist; the de-identified extraction sheet with URLs and timestamps can be shared on request for verification of counts, timelines, and sanction summaries.

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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

This section reports documentary findings from the doctrinal-comparative review and the enforcement-mapping exercise for the UAE and benchmarks (US/UK/EU). We present the legal/operational anchors first, followed by timeliness of issuer responses, the sanction profile, a cross-jurisdictional comparison, and an operational checklist. To make results auditable, each subsection introduces the relevant table/figure and, immediately after, highlights the key observations.

To summarize the analysis, the rules that most directly govern rumor-related misconduct and issuer responses are first summarized. Table 1 consolidates these anchors – exchange-level morning disclosure/suspension logic, DIFC supervisory engagement on rumor/speculation or ≈10% abnormal moves, and core market-abuse prohibitions that underpin enforcement.

The anchors in Table 1 establish a two-tier control environment: exchange-level mechanics that create same-day discipline, and supervisory engagement that triages potentially disorderly markets.

We next visualize typical rumor lifecycles. Figure 1 depicts the decision path from rumor emerging through issuer duty, defenses, and potential enforcement. Immediately afterward, Figure 2 shows the time strip commonly observed in practice, including the 09:00 disclosure discipline and 09:00–09:30 suspension window.

Table 1. UAE legal and operational anchors governing rumor-related misconduct

Instrument / Rule	Provision (example)	Operational Effect	Sanctions / Notes
Exchange listing & disclosure operations	Morning disclosure **by 09:00**; trading suspension **09:00–09:30** if missed	Compresses rumor persistence; forces same-day issuer response	Suspension window as compliance lever
DIFC supervisory guidance	Engage the supervisor on **rumor/ speculation** or **≈10%** abnormal move	Early supervisory triage and coordinated messaging	Applies in DIFC-listed context
Securities/market-abuse provisions	Prohibit false/misleading statements and manipulation	Doctrinal basis for rumor-related enforcement	Enables administrative fines and referrals



Figure 1. Decision tree – When does a statement become a prohibited rumor?



Figure 2. Time strip – From rumor emergence to resolution

Figure 1 formalizes the doctrinal tests that appear repeatedly across provisions and guidance. The path begins with the emergence of an unverified market-moving statement, tests materiality for a reasonable investor, verifies falsity/misleading character under UAE securities and exchange rules, and then routes the case to the issuer's 09:00 clarification discipline. Missed operational windows feed directly into supervisory or exchange-level action (suspension, administrative penalty, or referral), while timely clarifications neutralize the rumor and close the case.

The time strip in Figure 2 underscores how morning operations compress rumor persistence and provide a predictable enforcement canvas. An unverified market-moving statement is detected before the market opens. The issuer has until 09:00 to publish an authoritative clarification. If the 09:00 disclosure window is missed, the exchange may activate a 09:00–09:30 trading suspension to stabilize order flow and force a same-day clarification. After clarification, trading resumes and the case may still be reviewed for administrative enforcement, especially if the original statement was false or misleading.

We then catalogue illustrative public enforcement entries. Table 2 lists representative items in 2025 demonstrating the observed sanction ceiling, aggregate penalties, and individual-level fines.

These entries illustrate a credible upper bound (AED 5,000,000) alongside aggregate and individual penalties, with non-monetary outcomes (referrals, suspensions) appearing in case narratives.

Cross-jurisdictional alignment. We compare key dimension definitions, rebuttal protocols, safe harbors, and private actions in Table 3 and then position each jurisdiction on two salient axes in Figure 3.

The positioning clarifies where harmonization efforts could reduce friction for cross-listed issues.

Table 2. Illustrative UAE enforcement items (2019–2025) – Publicly reported

Year	Authority	Conduct (short)	Outcome	Monetary Sanction
2025	Securities regulator	Misleading conduct impacting investors	Administrative penalty + referral	AED 5,000,000
2025	Securities regulator	Multiple regulatory breaches (aggregate)	Administrative penalties across entities	AED 1,150,000 (aggregate)
2025	Securities regulator	Market violation by investors	Administrative penalty	AED 100,000

Table 3. Comparative matrix on definitions, rebuttal protocols, safe harbors, and private actions

Dimension	UAE	US	UK	EU
"Rumor/Misleading info" definition	Converges via misleading info/manipulation	Broad anti-fraud & manipulation	MAR/UK frameworks	MAR
Rebuttal expectations	Same-day via operations (09:00; suspension 09:00–09:30)	Rapid rebuttal practices; Reg FD context	Prompt clarification under MAR/market notices	Prompt public disclosure under MAR
Safe harbors	Less explicit for rumor rebuttal	Forward-looking statements safe harbor	MAR defenses and practices	MAR defenses and practices
Private actions	Narrower; admin emphasis	Broad class/derivative routes	Private claims; case-law evolution	Member-state dependent

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

Figure 3. Comparative positioning map

To aid implementation, Table 4 provides a rumor-response checklist for issuers; Table 5 summarizes investor redress channels at a glance.

Together, Table 4 and Table 5 translate structural findings into actionable steps for issuers and clarify remedy channels for stakeholders.

The same-day disclosure discipline (09:00 publication; 09:00–09:30 suspension if missed) and supervisory engagement triggers observed in the UAE (Results; Table 1; Figures 1 and 2) are consistent with theoretical predictions and microstructure evidence that timely verification reduces rumor persistence and stabilizes order flow (Abuzov, 2023). By scripting a narrow morning window, exchanges reduce coordination failures among investors exposed to unverified signals (Zhai et al., 2024; Akin & Akin, 2024). The sanction profile we documented – publicly observed penalties up to AED 5,000,000, plus aggregate and individual fines (Results; Table 2) – supports general deterrence, aligning with comparative research that visibility of sanctions matters (Alhosani et al., 2023; Biancotti & Ciocca, 2021).

Doctrinal anchors converge on prohibitions of misleading statements and manipulation, mirror-

Table 4. Issuer rumor-response checklist (operational)

Step	Action	Evidence Source	Compliance Note
1	Detect abnormal move/rumor	Market monitor, media scan	Trigger escalation
2	Notify supervisor (if applicable)	Email/portal record	On **rumor/speculation** or **≈10%** move
3	Prepare clarification	Draft + legal/CS review	Ensure accuracy; avoid selective disclosure
4	Publish by **09:00** (where rule applies)	Exchange timestamp	If delayed, expect **09:00–09:30** suspension
5	Follow-up Q&A / corrections	Subsequent notices	Keep cross-channel consistency

Table 5. Investor redress and remedies by Jurisdiction (high-Level)

Jurisdiction	Administrative Route	Civil/Private Route	Typical Outcomes
UAE	Fines, suspensions, referrals	Narrower private claims	Monetary penalties; undertakings
US	SEC/CFTC actions	Class/derivative suits	Fines, disgorgement, damages
UK	FCA/Exchange actions	Private claims	Fines, censures, damages
EU	National authorities	Private claims (Member State)	Fines; damages (varies)

ing Rule 10b-5 and MAR (Table 3). Operationally, the UAE's morning disclosure/suspension logic achieves the same policy goal as EU/UK "without delay" language – in practice, it is often faster because it sets a clock. Two divergences remain: (i) explicit safe harbors for rapid rebuttals are less detailed than US forward-looking-statement frameworks, increasing perceived litigation risk around fast clarifications; and (ii) private action pathways are narrower than US/UK, limiting restitution even as administrative deterrence is strong. Figure 3 plots these differences along "explicitness of rebuttal/safe harbors" and "breadth of private actions."

Building on the literature and the comparative matrix, three levers would improve alignment and predictability: Codify rebuttal timelines in higher-order texts. Literature and practice favor predictable clocks (Vasiloi, 2023; MAR/ESMA guidance). Translating the operational 09:00/09:30 logic into supervisory rule text would harden expectations and help cross-listed issuers harmonize procedures across venues.

Introduce calibrated safe harbors for rapid rebuttals. Following the US experience with forward-looking statements, safe harbors can lower legal friction for good-faith, time-pressured issuer statements while preserving anti-fraud enforcement. This mitigates under-disclosure when rumors spread via social media (Afanasieva et al., 2023). And clarify private-action interfaces. Comparative studies show that administrative sanctions deter, but private suits deliver restitution and marginal deterrence (Walia et al., 2020). Issuer and investor guidance on thresholds and evidence for private claims would round out the remedial toolkit without diluting supervisory speed.

Table 4 (issuer checklist) formalizes a stepwise response: detect → notify supervisor when indicated (rumor/speculation or ≈10% abnormal move) → draft and legally vet → publish by 09:00 → maintain cross-channel consistency.

The descriptive indicators are resilient to reasonable variations: when we exclude items with ambiguous rumor onset times, the relative ordering of timeliness observations does not change; when we cap outlier fines, the median sanction profile remains well above a purely symbolic level. These patterns mirror findings that predictable halts and broadly disseminated clarifications stabilize markets even when exact rumor timestamps are fuzzy (Xudong & Wenting, 2022; Maghaireh, 2024).

Results rely on public records; undisclosed supervisory interactions are not captured. We therefore refrain from causal claims about market quality improvements. A natural extension is an event-study (Yang, 2024) linking the 09:00/09:30 mechanics and rebuttal speed to abnormal returns, volumes, spreads, and volatility; another is a diffusion analysis of social-media propagation to calibrate when supervisor engagement is most valuable.

The UAE system already moves quickly and sanctions credibly – two pillars the literature finds effective. Codifying rebuttal clocks, adding measured safe harbors, and sharpening private-action guidance would make outcomes more predictable for issuers and investors while preserving strong administrative control.

We propose three low-cost, high-clarity refinements: (i) codify explicit rebuttal clocks in supervisory text to mirror the operational 09:00/09:30 discipline; (ii) introduce calibrated safe harbors for good-faith rapid clarifications (time-pressed statements that correct or neutralize rumors while preserving anti-fraud enforcement); and (iii) clarify private-action interfaces (thresholds and evidentiary guidance) to complement administrative deterrence with restitution where appropriate.

CONCLUSION

This study evaluates how the UAE commercial and securities law protects transactions against market-moving rumors and benchmarks the UAE's approach against the US, UK, and EU. The United Arab Emirates maintains a comprehensive law system that prioritizes both preventive procedures and suitable penalties through Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 and its subsequent changes, which define the boundaries

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of criminalizing misleading market facts. The examination confirms that UAE authorities have moved from basic imprisonment toward sophisticated financial punishments as stronger deterrents for market crimes. Through its Securities and Commodities Authority, the UAE establishes mandatory disclosure requirements that serve as the primary front against information gaps where rumors normally prevail.

The study makes a major discovery by recognizing how the UAE uses innovative technology, such as AI-powered surveillance systems with regulatory sandboxes that embody the development of rumor distribution patterns. These modern adaptations prove forward-thinking because they represent advanced responses to digital communication challenges in the United Arab Emirates. The UAE regulatory model protects investors while maintaining reasonable expectations for market players through separate categorizations of market participants, including investors and other market actors. Data indicate that the UAE uses an equilibrium regulatory framework that safeguards market integrity alongside reasonable regulatory constraints that prevent obstructed market efficiency. The combination of preventive methods, reasonable penalties, technological advancements, and international partnerships has made the UAE a leading model for preventing securities market crime, serving as a useful example for other jurisdictions operating in complex digital financial systems.

AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

Conceptualization: Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi, Ibrahim Mohamed Shaker Ali.
Data curation: Ibrahim Mohamed Shaker Ali, Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi.
Formal analysis: Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi.
Investigation: Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi.
Methodology: Ibrahim Mohamed Shaker Ali, Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi.
Project administration: Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi.
Resources: Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi.
Supervision: Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi.
Validation: Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi.
Writing – original draft: Ibrahim Mohamed Shaker Ali, Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi.
Writing – review & editing: Ahmed Moustafa Aldabousi, Ibrahim Mohamed Shaker Ali.

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