“The determinants of Islamic governance disclosure: the case of Indonesian Islamic banks”

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Abstract
This paper aims to examine the determinants of Islamic Governance Disclosure (IGD) in Islamic banks in Indonesia. The research method used is a quantitative approach involving Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia, where their annual reports can be accessed during the 2011–2018 observation period. The data collection methods used are analysis of documentation and content analysis. Content analysis was used to calculate the IGD index. Path analysis with WarpPLS software was used to analyze data. The results show that the number of members of the Sharia supervisory board had a negative and significant effect on IGD, while leverage, size, and age can influence the IGD positively and significantly. In addition, institutional ownership has a negative and significant effect on IGD. Profitability and composition of the independent board of commissioners do not significantly affect the IGD.

Keywords
independent board of commissioners, leverage, ownership structure, profitability, sharia supervisory board, size

JEL Classification G21, G34

INTRODUCTION
Banks operating in Indonesia consist of two forms, namely conventional banks and Islamic banks. Islamic Bank is a bank that operates based on Islamic sharia. Islamic banks implement good corporate governance (GCG) in their operations. Some terms are known such as sharia corporate governance or sharia governance (Ginena, 2014; Hasan, 2010; Muneeza & Hassan, 2014), or Islamic corporate governance (Bhatti & Bhatti, 2010; Choudhury & Alam, 2013; Choudhury & Hoque, 2006; Elghuweel, Ntim, Opong, & Avison, 2017). Sharia corporate governance is different from conventional GCG and both have unique objectives (Alnasser & Muhammed, 2012; Muneeza & Hassan, 2014). In the framework of sharia corporate governance, decision making for companies must be based on shura or consultation (Muneeza & Hassan, 2014). Hassan (2012) proposed two structures on sharia corporate governance, namely the tawhid and shura based approach and the stakeholder’s approach. Hasan (2010) argued that the sharia governance model in Islamic financial institutions does not exist yet.

The GCG implementation for sharia commercial banks in Indonesia includes disclosure in reference to Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 11/33/PBI/2009 officially implemented on January 1, 2010 (Ardhanareswari, 2017). Ginena (2014) stated that there are at least five (5) models for...
implementing sharia governance systems, namely reactive approach (applied in the UK and Turkey),
passive approach (applied in Saudi Arabia), minimalist approach (applied in Bahrain, Dubai and Qatar),
pro-active approach (applied in Malaysia), and interventionist approach (applied in Pakistan). Several
international institutions issued standards and principles regarding GCG, such as OECD, IFSB, and
AAOIFI. AAOIFI adopts Statement on Governance Principles for Islamic Financial Institutions.

The factors that influence the extent of Islamic governance disclosure have not yet been widely stud-
ied. Azid and Alnodel (2018) found that industry type, ownership structure, and board composition
have a significant effect on the SGD area. While size, leverage, and ROA did not prove to have a sig-
nificant effect. Albassam and Ntim (2017) found a significant effect of Islamic value disclosure on
the level of corporate governance disclosure. They also revealed a significant effect of the audit firm
size, board size, government ownership, institutional ownership, and the presence of a GCG com-
mittee on the level of voluntary CG disclosure. However, these authors failed to prove the effect of
profitability on CG disclosure. Grassa (2018) confirmed that ownership concentration, ROA, leverage,
and bank age had a significant effect on CGDI, while size of the bank does not have a significant
effect on CGDI.

The results of other studies indicated that the Islamic value index, quality of governance, macroeco-
nomic factors (GDP and inflation) have a positive and significant effect on CGDI (Sarhan & Ntim, 2018).
Also, a significant effect of directors’ ownership, company size, company age, and ROA on CGDI was
found. Block shareholding, growth opportunities, and leverage do not prove to have a significant effect.
Haddad, Sbeiti, and Qasim (2017) stated that company size is the main determinant of CG disclosure,
followed by external auditing and liquidity. Abdullah, Percy, and Stewart (2015) found that factors in-
fluencing voluntary governance disclosure include the size of Islamic banks, the level of political and
civil repression and the legal system.

This study aims to examine the determinants of the Islamic Governance Disclosure in Islamic banks in
Indonesia. It focuses on the activities of the Sharia supervisory board (SSB), the performance of zakat,
and disclosures on non-halal income. The determinants that are examined influential on IGD are the
SSB, profitability, institutional ownership, government ownership, company size, leverage, and com-
pany age.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. The concept of Islamic
governance disclosure

Agency theory became the basic theory in this
study because it is often used as the basis for re-
viewing good corporate governance (GCG).
Agency theory explains that agency relations arise
when one or more persons (principal) employ an-
other person (agent) to provide a service and then
delegate decision-making authority to the agent
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Besides, it is stated that
companies that separate management functions
from ownership functions will be vulnerable to
agency conflicts. The causes of the conflict include
decision-making process related to two things, namely:

1) fundraising activities; and
2) deciding how funds are invested.

Agency conflicts, or often referred to as agen-
cy problems, can be minimized by a supervisory
mechanism that can align these interests so that
agency costs arise.

Jensen and Meckling (1976) defined corporate
governance as a model or set of rules for institu-
tional practical development to protect investors
from managerial opportunistic behavior and en-
trepreneurial spirit. Corporate governance is a
series of mechanisms that can protect minority
parties (outside investors/minority shareholders)
from exploration carried out by managers and
controlling shareholders (insider) with an empha-
sis on legal mechanisms. Hasan and Butt (2009)
stated that corporate governance can be interpreted as a philosophy and mechanism related to value creation for shareholders. In this case, corporate governance requires processes and structures that facilitate through the company management in such a way that it can ultimately guarantee the protection of individuals and all stakeholders.

The increasing number of companies that must comply with sharia requires the formation of corporate governance rules in accordance with Islamic law (Muneeza & Hassan, 2014). The goal is not only to work for profit for shareholders and stakeholders, but also to thank God and to give benefit to the community. Ginena (2014) stated that “… sharia governance is the overall system that manages the conformity of Islamic banks and IFIs to the precepts of sharia pertaining to commercial transactions in all activities”. M. Bhatti and M. I. Bhatti (2010) described the Islamic Corporate Governance (IGC) as follows:

ICG seeks to devise ways in which economic agents, the legal system, and corporate governance can be directed by moral and social values based on Sharia laws. Its supporters believe that all economic, corporate, and business activities should be based on an ethno-religious paradigm, with the sole aim being the welfare of individuals and society as a whole. In many ways, ICG pursues the same objectives as conventional Corporate Governance, but within the religious-based moral codes of Islam. However, there is currently no clear unified understanding of “corporate governance” under Islamic financial law; a model of ICG may be proposed by reconciling the objectives of Sharia laws with the stakeholder model of corporate governance.

Based on the above description, it can be concluded that the Islamic Governance Disclosure (IGD) referred to in this study is the disclosure of the implementation of GCG in Islamic commercial banks based on existing regulations. The dimensions distinguishing between GCG and IGD disclosures are disclosures regarding the existence of sharia supervisory boards, the performance of zakat, non-halal income, and other disclosure dimensions.

Darmadi (2013) tried to reveal GCG practices in Islamic banks in Indonesia. He used the Corporate Governance Disclosure Index (CGDI) to assess disclosure rates in seven Islamic public banks in Indonesia. Meanwhile Abdullah, Percy, and Stewart (2013) compared sharia disclosures within the framework of the sharia governance system in Islamic banks in Indonesia and Malaysia in 2009. Ardhanareswari (2017) explored two Islamic commercial banks, namely BNI Syariah and BRI Syariah. GCG disclosure focuses on disclosure of GCG principles, which include transparency, accountability, responsibility, independence and fairness and equality.

1.2. Determinants of Islamic governance disclosure

The issue of good corporate governance (GCG) remains interesting to explore. GCG is an important instrument, especially in managing business entities. Measurement of GCG also varies in research, including using the proxy mechanism of GCG or GCG index. Many researchers try to reveal the influence of GCG on financial performance or company value (Arora & Sharma, 2016; Asrori, 2014; Malik & Makhdoom, 2016; Wahyudin & Solikhah, 2017). Other researchers tested the correlation of GCG and corporate social responsibility (Said, Joseph, & Mohd Sidek, 2017).

Gandia (2008), Green and Graham (2015), Hassan (2012), Ntim, Opong, Danbolt, and Thomas (2012), Tsamenyi, EnninfulAdu, and Onumah (2007) conducted research on GCG disclosure. Besides examining the extent of disclosure, they also considered factors influencing GCG (Gandia, 2008; Ntim et al., 2012; Tsamenyi et al., 2007). In the context of companies in Indonesia, Djakman, Siregar, and Harahap (2017) tested the practice of GCG disclosure and found that the audit and internal audit committee disclosures were still relatively low in 2012 and 2013.

Tsamenyi et al. (2007) found that ownership structure, dispersion of shareholding, and firm size significantly influence GCG disclosure. Gandia (2008) found that the level of disclosure depends on the level of the company, its age, visibility, and reality related to the information and communication service industry. Ntim et al. (2012) found that block ownership was negatively related to GCG disclosure, while board size, au-
dit firm size, cross-listing, the existence of CG committees, government ownership and institutional ownership had a positive effect on voluntary CG disclosure.

CG disclosure should be conducted by a company to gain the legitimacy of various parties that the company has fulfilled the applicable responsibilities and regulations. Profitability is one of the factors influencing the level of voluntary disclosure of companies (Islamic governance disclosure). Companies with good profitability tend to disclose important information to the public, including governance disclosure. This is in accordance with agency theory, where CG disclosure is part of the form of corporate management’s responsibility towards shareholders. Management seeks to show good performance by carrying out IGD. There are only a few researchers who have proven a significant relationship between profitability with IGD (Grassa, 2018; Sarhan & Ntim, 2018), while there are those who also fail to prove their relationship (Azid & Alnodel, 2018; Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton, 2012).

Size and leverage are the next factors influencing IGD. The larger the company size, the wider the CG disclosure. Leverage has a negative influence. The smaller the level of leverage, the wider the IGD will be. Companies that have high debt tend to be more careful in disclosing their information to the public. This is due to company’s concern about the influence of information on the decisions of investors and other parties. The empirical test results have found a positive effect of firm size (Abdullah et al., 2015; Haddad et al., 2017; Sarhan & Ntim, 2018) and leverage (Grassa, 2018) on IGD. There are also researchers who have not succeeded in proving a firm size dependence on IGD (Azid & Alnodel, 2018; Grasa, 2018) and leverage on IGD (Azid & Alnodel, 2018; Sarhan & Ntim, 2018).

The existence of an independent board of commissioners is also predicted to influence the extent of Islamic governance disclosure. This means the higher the presence of independent commissioners, the more Islamic bank will increase IGD. Indrawaty and Wardayati (2016) argue that the composition of the board will influence the implementation of Islamic governance. Azid and Alnodel (2018) and Albassam and Ntim (2017) found the influence of the board composition on shariah governance disclosure. Ownership structure is also a determinant of IGD (Azid & Alnodel, 2018; Grasa, 2018). Islamic banks owned by the government tend to be more obedient. The IG disclosure will be even wider. Albassam and Ntim (2017) successfully managed to find a significant effect of government ownership on CG disclosure.

Researchers will also examine the relationship of the Sharia supervisory board to the IGD. The relationship between SSB and IGD is less evident. The existence of SSB will increase the degree of IGD. SSB measurement includes the number of SSB members, SSB education level, attendance rate of SSB member meetings, and other relevant measures. The existence of SSB in Islamic banks is crucial to ensuring that Islamic banks operate in accordance with the rules and teachings of Islam. CG disclosure was also influenced by SSB. The more active the SSB members, the more Islamic banks will tend to express CG well. Sarhan and Ntim (2018) found that the Islamic value index had a positive and significant effect on CGDI.

Based on the description, the research hypotheses are as follows:

H1: SSB has a positive and significant effect on IGD.

H2: Profitability has a positive and significant effect on IGD.

H3: Leverage has a positive and significant effect on IGD.

H4: Size has a positive and significant effect on IGD.

H5: Bank age has a positive and significant effect on IGD.

H6: The composition of independent commissioners has a positive and significant effect on IGD.

H7: Institutional ownership has a positive and significant effect on IGD.
2. METHOD

2.1. Research population and samples

This research is a cause-and-effect study to examine the factors influencing Islamic governance disclosure (IGD) in Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia. The population in this study is Islamic commercial banks operating in Indonesia. The sampling method uses purposive sampling method addressed to the banks having the criteria of the availability of an annual report online for eight years of observation (2011 to 2018). There are nine Islamic banks that meet the criteria, namely Muamalat Indonesia Bank, Bank Syariah Mandiri, BNI Syariah, Panin Bank Syariah, BCA Syariah, BRI Syariah, May Bank Syariah, Bukopin Syariah, and Mega Bank Syariah.

2.2. Operational definition of research variables

The dependent variable in this study is the IGD in Islamic commercial banks in Indonesia. The dimensions are developed from the study of Abdullah et al. (2013) and Bank Indonesia Regulation No. 11/33/PBI/2009. There are four main items in the dimensions of Islamic governance disclosure, namely disclosures regarding SSB, disclosure of SSB reports, disclosure of zakat, and disclosure of non-halal income. The independent variables in this study are the existence of SSB, profitability, institutional ownership, government ownership, company size, leverage, and company age. Table 1 gives the operational definitions of variables.

2.3. Techniques or data collection and analysis

Data collection techniques used in this study are documentation and content analysis. Content analysis was developed based on previous research (Abdullah et al., 2013) to measure the disclosure of Islamic governance in Islamic banks in Indonesia. The data analysis method used is path analysis aiming to test the influence of independent variables on IGD. Besides, the WarpPLS 6.0 software was employed.

3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

3.1. Results

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistic of research variables. The mean value of IGD is 0.6468. It means that Islamic banks in Indonesia have disclosed Islamic governance 64.68%. The score is quite good. The attendance of SSB members for meeting is very good. The score (mean) is 0.9327 or 93.27%. The Islamic banks in Indonesia have two or three SSB members. There is a large deviation in standard value of profitability (ROA).
and ROE) and debt (DAR and DER). There is a large percentage of independent commissioner board members, which is 65.07% on average.

The prerequisite test results using the WarpPLS software are in Table 3. Based on the results of the prerequisite criteria test, hypothesis testing can be conducted because it meets all the criteria.

The results of hypothesis testing are in Figure 1. The results show that SSBMEM (membership of the Sharia supervisory board) has a value of \( P = 0.02 \) with a coefficient of –0.23. This means that the Sharia supervisory board has a significant effect on Islamic governance disclosure (IGD). However, the coefficient value is negative. The SSBMET variable (number of Sharia supervisory board meetings) has a \( P \)-value = 0.330 with a coefficient = –0.051. This means SSB meetings have no significant effect on IGD. SSBATT (the presence of SSB) has a \( P \)-value of 0.487 with a coefficient value of –0.004, which means that the attendance rate of SSB members has no significant effect on IGD.

The profitability variable is measured by two proxies, namely ROA and ROE. Both are not proven to have a significant effect on IGD. It can be seen that the \( P \)-value of more than 0.005 is 0.239 and 0.153. While the leverage variable with DER proxy proved to have a significant effect on IGD. The \( P \)-value of DER is 0.031 or less than 0.05 with a path coefficient value of 0.025. The firm size and total assets size variables showed a positive and significant effect on IGD, in which it has \( P \) value < 0.001 with path coefficient 0.602.

The company age variable (AGE) has a \( P \)-value = 0.002 with a path coefficient of 0.318. This shows that the company age has a significant and positive impact on IGD. The INDCOM variable (independent commissioner) has not shown a significant effect on IGD. \( P \)-value of INDCOM is 0.208 or more than 0.05. And the INST variable (institutional ownership) has a \( P \)-value of 0.001 with a coefficient of –0.330. This means that institutional ownership has a significant effect on IGD.

### Table 2. Descriptive statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std. deviation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>IGD</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.6468</td>
<td>0.0964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB members</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.3099</td>
<td>0.4713</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB meetings</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14.1268</td>
<td>4.1534</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSB attendance</td>
<td>0.58</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.9327</td>
<td>4.3227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on assets</td>
<td>~20.13</td>
<td>9.51</td>
<td>0.4428</td>
<td>4.3227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return on equity</td>
<td>~94.01</td>
<td>57.98</td>
<td>4.1739</td>
<td>20.9829</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt-to-assets ratio</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>80.98</td>
<td>18.4059</td>
<td>12.5230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debt-to-equity ratio</td>
<td>6.28</td>
<td>425.7</td>
<td>166.7266</td>
<td>108.5071</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assets</td>
<td>27.22</td>
<td>36.5025</td>
<td>30.1117</td>
<td>1.7217</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>9.5070</td>
<td>7.0304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent commissioner board</td>
<td>0.29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.6507</td>
<td>0.1531</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Institutional ownership</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>0.6468</td>
<td>0.0964</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3. Results of the prerequisite test

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Items</th>
<th>Criteria</th>
<th>Test results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Average path coefficient (APC)</td>
<td>( P &lt; 0.005 )</td>
<td>\text{APC} = 0.187, ( P = 0.024 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average R-squared (ARS)</td>
<td>( P &lt; 0.005 )</td>
<td>\text{ARS} = 0.840, ( P &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average adjusted R-squared (AARS)</td>
<td>( P &lt; 0.005 )</td>
<td>\text{AARS} = 0.810, ( P &lt; 0.001 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average block VIF (AVIF)</td>
<td>Acceptable if ( s \leq 5 ), ideally ( s \leq 3.3 )</td>
<td>\text{AVIF} = 2.751</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Average full collinearity VIF (AFVIF)</td>
<td>Acceptable if ( s \leq 5 ), ideally ( s \leq 3.3 )</td>
<td>\text{AFVIF} = 3.111</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4. DISCUSSION

The results showed that leverage with the DER proxy, company size, and company age had a positive and significant effect on IGD. While the existence of a Sharia supervisory board with a proxy for the number of SSB members and institutional ownership proved to have a negative and significant impact on IGD. Other variables were not proven to have a significant effect on IGD.

The existence of the SSB is supposed to have a positive and significant effect on IGD. This means the existence of the SSB will cause the management of the Islamic banks to fully disclose information, including the implementation of corporate governance. In this study, the existence of SSB measured by the number of members proved to be significant but negative. The increasing number of the SSB members actually caused a decline in the index of Islamic governance disclosure. This can be explained by the fact that the number of SSB members is less important than that of its performance. Indrawaty and Wardayati (2016) state that the composition of SSB membership is a determining factor of the Islamic corporate governance. Sarhan and Ntim (2018) found the Islamic value index had a positive and significant effect on CGDI.

Profitability has not been proven to have a significant effect on IGD. Islamic banks have suggested that the Islamic government’s disclosure is important to implement. Therefore, it does not depend on the status of the company, whether it could make a profit or not. Research findings supported the previous studies (Azid & Alnodel, 2018; Samaha et al., 2012). However, there is evidence to suggest that profitability has a positive and significant effect on IGD (Grassa, 2018; Sarhan & Ntim, 2018).

Leverage is also proven to have a positive and significant effect on IGD. This means the higher the leverage level of Islamic banks, the higher

Figure 1. Path analysis
er the index of Islamic governance disclosure. The management of Islamic banks wanted to show that they are able to manage the company well despite the high level of leverage. Thus, trust in the bank is maintained. Grassa (2018) and Sharma (2014) have succeeded in finding a significant effect of leverage on governance disclosure. Whereas Azid and Alnodel (2018) and Sarhan and Ntim (2018) found insignificant influence.

The results of the next study indicated that the size of the company has a positive and significant effect on IGD. The level of disclosure of Islamic governance will be higher if Islamic banks have high assets. The bigger the Islamic Bank is, the greater the understanding of the importance of Islamic governance disclosure will be. Research findings confirmed previous results (Abdullah et al., 2015; Haddad et al., 2017; Sarhan & Ntim, 2018). Further, Sharma (2014) also found a significant relationship between company size and corporate governance disclosure. Islamic governance disclosure is also influenced by the company age. Like the company size, the longer the Islamic bank is established, the higher the level of Islamic governance disclosure will be. The long-established Islamic banks have gone through many rules and guidelines to implement Islamic governance. Islamic governance disclosure is considered to have a positive impact on the company.

Institutional ownership has a negative and significant effect on IGD. This means the ownership of shares by institutions requires a low level of disclosure of Islamic governance. This could be due to the poor understanding of the importance of Islamic governance disclosure. The disclosure of Islamic governance may not be considered to have a significant effect on the performance of Islamic banks. Therefore, it was not properly implemented. The higher disclosure of Islamic governance allows the more information to be spread openly. This may be a condition avoided by institutional shareholders.

**CONCLUSION**

The result showed that the number of sharia supervisory board members, leverage, size, and age had significant and positive impact on IGD. And there is a negative and significant effect of institutional ownership on IGD. The number of meetings and the attendance rate are not able to significantly influence IGD. Meanwhile, profitability has not been proven to have a significant impact on IGD. Debt to equity ratio (DER) was also not proven to have a significant effect on IGD. At least, the composition of the independent board of commissioners also has no significant effect on IGD.

The existence of a Sharia supervisory board is one of the important components in the operation of Islamic banks. SSB can play a role in ensuring the operational activities of Islamic banks in accordance with Sharia (Islamic law). This article argues that the existence of SSB, as measured by the number of SSB members, can significantly affect the disclosure of Islamic governance.

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